Psychology: The core discipline.

Fowler, Raymond D.

doi:10.1037/0003-066x.45.1.1

Cited by 50 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In fact, in direct contrast to many who have argued that science and practice are fundamentally different endeavors no matter what the topic, the Boulder model in clinical psychology explicitly yoked science and practice together in its now famous "scientist-practitioner" model of training. Similarly, in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association, Fowler (1990) argued that both the science and the profession together represented the core of the discipline. And yet around the time of his address, in what was the latest manifestation of the institutional struggle between researchers and practitioners, the American Psychological Society (now the Association for Psychological Science) had recently formed, breaking away from APA because a large group of scientifically oriented psychologists felt there had been too much drift away from the science.…”

Section: Problems Of Epistemology Mission and Valuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Unified Theory of Psychology

Henriques

2011

107

100

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Problems Of Epistemology Mission and Valuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Unified Theory of Psychology

Henriques

2011

107

100

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Fowler, 1990;Koch, 1969;Simon, 1992), often expressing genuine concern about the paucity of established and cumulative results and theories. Thus, note the emergence of a consensus on an important behavioral fact from different areas of psychology as well as economics.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

From subjective probabilities to decision weights: The effect of asymmetric loss functions on the evaluation of uncertain outcomes and events.

Weber

1994

Psychological Bulletin

204

149

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Much of decision aiding uses a divide-and-conquer strategy to help people with risky decisions. Assessing the utility of outcomes and one's degree of belief in their likelihood are assumed to be separable tasks, the results of which can then be combined to determine the preferred alternative. Evidence from different areas of psychology now provides a growing consensus that this assumption is too simplistic. Observed dependencies in the evaluation of uncertain outcomes and the likelihood of the events giving rise to them are frequent and systematic. Dependencies seem to derive from general strategic processes that take into consideration asymmetric costs of over-vs. underestimates of uncertain quantities. This asymmetric-loss-function interpretation provides a psychological explanation for observed judgments and decisions under uncertainty and links them to other judgment tasks. The decision weights estimated when applying dependent-utility models to choices are not simply reflections of perceived subjective probability but a response to several constraints, all of which modify the weight of risky or uncertain outcomes.Perhaps more than any other social science, psychology maintains an ongoing debate about its status as a coherent field of scholarship (cf. Fowler, 1990;Koch, 1969;Simon, 1992), often expressing genuine concern about the paucity of established and cumulative results and theories. Thus, note the emergence of a consensus on an important behavioral fact from different areas of psychology as well as economics. This article brings together some commonalities in results and in the mechanisms designed to explain them. These should be of theoretical as well as practical interest to anybody interested in human judgments and decisions. With this interpretative review, I attempt to present these often technical results and theories in an integrative and more accessible way. I argue that people's behavior in the judgment and decision situations discussed can be seen as responsive to self-or outwardly imposed constraints in their environment rather than as the result of perceptual or cognitive errors. In particular, I suggest that in situations in which an uncertain quantity needs to be assessed, for example, the probability with which some event will occur or the value of Parts of this article were presented as an invited address at the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Society of Mathematical Psychology. This article was completed while I was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, with financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SES-9022192 and the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.I am grateful to Michael Birnbaum, David Budescu, Ward Edwards, Ido Erev, Bill Estes, Claudia Gonzalez, Danny Kahneman, Lola Lopes, Duncan Luce, Barbara Mellers, Robin Hogarth, David Sears, Zur Shapira, Abe Tesser, Tom Wallsten, Martin Weber, and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments and suggestions.Correspondence concerning this article should ...

show abstract

“…Just as Fowler (1990) characterized psychology as a "core discipline" that contributes concepts and findings essential to the functioning of other disciplines, Wapner (1995) noted that the contextualist concerns of environmental psychology provide the basis for integrating diverse subfields of psychology and bridging the gap between professionally oriented and academic psychologists. He also contended that the core conceptual and methodological concerns of environmental psychology can serve as a "centripetal" force to counter "centrifugal" trends toward specialization and fragmentation in psychological research and graduate training (cf.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%