Public affairs practice and lobbying inequality: Reform and regulation of the influence game

Abstract

Although vigorous lobbying by groups within society is essential for the functioning of democracy, it is widely perceived that resource-rich groups, particularly corporations, enjoy unfair advantages and influence. This perception damages public trust in the efficacy of civic participation and the legitimacy of policymaking. This problem intermittently leads reformers and scholars to assess and develop policies that might assist in addressing lobbying power imbalances. This paper takes up Moloney 0 s call for exploring ways of intervening in the communicative economy to directly address the problem of lobbying inequality. It considers the extent of lobbying inequalities and theoretical frameworks for understanding how resources enable an influence advantage, before assessing the types of regulatory approaches that have been used by democratic institutions. Voluntary measures that could be taken by the corporate sector and professional associations are considered, alongside the current interest in using digital platforms to identify inequalities and incorporate public preferences as a variable in allocating lobbying resources.

Regulating lobbying through voluntary transparency clubs: The connoisseurs’ assessment. Evidence from the European Union

“…Understanding these key actors' positions on matters of supranational lobbying regulation is essential given the high stake of regulating private actors' participation in policymaking for the legitimacy and accountability of the EU system of governance, and the ever-present theme of 'regulatory capture' raised in the literature on regulatory governance when discussing regulators-regulatees interactions (Stigler 1971). Furthermore, lobbying regulation has important consequences for policy representation and inequality (Davidson 2017). The literature on US lobbying regulation indicates that the stringency of lobbying regulations has significant effects on levels of political inequality (Flavin 2015) and bias in interest representation (Ozymy 2010).…”

A Price to Pay? The Backsides of the Privileged Access to the Political System

“…Lobbyism can be defined as communicative action aimed at influencing political decision-makers (Davidson, 2017), and lobbyists tend to become an essential part of the political process. In a classical pluralist system, policy emerges in a relation between a supply side (organized interests) and a demand side (political decision-makers), where the supply-side actors mobilize the will and concerns of citizens and focus the attention of decision-makers on specific problems and solutions (Mahoney, 2004).…”

Samfundslederskab i en fragmenteret tidsalder

“…Lobbyisme kan defineres som kommunikative handlinger, der har til formål at påvirke politiske beslutningstagere (Davidson 2017:1) såvel som den offentlige dagsorden (Aagaard & BlachØrsten 2018;Binderkrantz & Pedersen 2017). Relationen mellem lobbyisten og beslutningstageren er som regel uformel og ikke institutionaliseret og står i modsaetning til den korporative stats formelle og institutionaliserede relationer (Blach-Ørsten, Willig, & Hemming Rommetvedt et al, 2012: 461).…”