2016
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12132
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Public and Private Hospitals, Congestion, and Redistribution

Abstract: This paper studies how congestion in the public health sector can be used as both an in‐kind and in‐cash redistributive tool. In our model, agents differ in productivity and they can obtain a health service either from a congested public hospital or from a noncongested private one at a higher price. With pure in‐kind redistribution, agents fail to internalize their impact on congestion, and the demand for the public hospital is higher than optimal. When productivities are not observable but the social planner … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
2

Relationship

0
2

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 2 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 23 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…However, if the social planner weighs heavily the welfare of patients with low delay costs, and patients are sufficiently heterogeneous, it is optimal to maintain positive waiting times in the public system so that patients highly averse to delays opt out of the public system and the per-capita cost of public service is reduced for everyone. Canta and Leroux (2012) extend Hoel and Saether (2003) by assuming that patients differ in income. They show that a social planner with a utilitarian welfare function and preferences for income redistribution can implement a (first-best) welfare optimum through lump-sum taxation and a subsidy on the private hospital fee.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…However, if the social planner weighs heavily the welfare of patients with low delay costs, and patients are sufficiently heterogeneous, it is optimal to maintain positive waiting times in the public system so that patients highly averse to delays opt out of the public system and the per-capita cost of public service is reduced for everyone. Canta and Leroux (2012) extend Hoel and Saether (2003) by assuming that patients differ in income. They show that a social planner with a utilitarian welfare function and preferences for income redistribution can implement a (first-best) welfare optimum through lump-sum taxation and a subsidy on the private hospital fee.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast to Hoel and Saether (2003) and Canta and Leroux (2012), our goal is to analyze and compare the effectiveness of subsidy schemes in reducing service delays and waiting time cost. Hoel and Saether (2003) assume that public waiting time is independent of demand, and that there is no budget constraint on subsidization of private care.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation