Public Choice and Tort Reform

Zywicki, Todd J.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.244658

Cited by 8 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…Thus, with respect to mass torts and other similar issues, even though injured individuals are not repeat players, the lawyers who represent them often are, and thus are willing to engage in litigation and other activities in order to expand the reach of liability under law Rubin and Bailey 1994). Moreover, changes in communications technology and changes in legal procedure both have made it easier for interest groups (such as lawyers) to organize more effectively to promote legal change , as well as raising the stakes in current and future cases by making it easier to aggregate plaintiffs' claims and launch expensive litigation (Zywicki 2000).…”

Section: = (Vl)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Discrete well-organized groups, for instance, will tend to be more effective in organizing strategic litigation in much the same manner that they will in organizing for effective lobbying. Well-organized groups may also be able to bring about settlements that prevent "bad" cases from establishing undesirable precedents (Stearns and Zywicki 2009) or seek to influence judicial appointments or elections (Zywicki 2000;Rubin 2005b). …”

Section: Public Choice Critiques Of the Common Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Common law and economic efficiency

Zywicki¹,

Stringham²

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Section: = (Vl)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Public Choice Critiques Of the Common Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Common law and economic efficiency

Zywicki¹,

Stringham²

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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“…Zywicki (2000) argues that as the lawyers demand tort expansion, this demand is actually met by a supply from socially activist judges.…”

Section: Legal Systems In the United Kingdom And The United Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to certain characteristics that promote and facilitate litigation, the American legal environment is also considered by many to be pro‐plaintiff. Involvement of American judges in politics (Atiyah, 1987; Lord Irvine of Lairg, 2001; Tabarrok and Helland, 2000; Tetley, 1999; Zywicki, 2000), the highly specialized and eager trial lawyers driven by contingent‐fee contracts (Atiyah, 1987; Herzog, 1990; Rubin, 2004), lack of a loser pays rule (Atiyah and Summers, 1987; Posner, 1996), high likelihood of sympathy verdicts by juries (Gergen, 1999; Hans, 1996; Hersch and Viscusi, 2002; Tetley, 1999; Viscusi, 2003), availability of class action suits and excessive damage awards (Atiyah, 1987; CBO, 2003; Zywicki, 2000) together generate a setting that induces the society to use the tort system.…”

Section: Implications For Food Safetymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3), availability of punitive damages and class action suits (CBO, 2003). There is a lot of concern about the juries' inability to assign liability and determine proper punishment (Bernstein, 1996; Kahneman et al, 1998; Klugheit, 2002; Olson, 1989; Viscusi, 2003, 2004; Zywicki, 2000). Kahneman et al (1998) argue that efficiency is hindered when juries award highly unpredictable and excessive punitive damage awards.…”

Section: Implications For Food Safetymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Legal systems, institutional environment, and food safety

Brewster

Goldsmith

2007

Agricultural Economics

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In the aftermath of the recent food scares, the United States and the United Kingdom face major challenges to maintain a safe food system. Regulators on opposite sides of the Atlantic are facing rapid product and process innovations, changes in consumption behaviors, expansion of international trade, and discovery of new food hazards. The U.K. and the U.S. demonstrate different approaches to manage safety risks. This article will focus on two issues: the reasons behind the differences in the American and English policy approaches to food safety, and how these differences impact U.S. safety outcomes. A comparative legal framework is provided to understand how food safety is elicited in the economy and the incentive implications of the different institutional settings. These two different lenses, because they differ so, teach us about the fundamental sources of safety. The U.K.'s prevalent doctrine is parliamentary sovereignty and leads to a regulatory framework, while the U.S. is based on constitutional supremacy and relies on a legal framework. The source of safety under a regulatory framework is the government bureaucracy, while the U.S. legal framework provides an important point of departure-the constitutional standing of the firm and the consumer. We argue that while the U.K. system is structured to work through a regulatory framework to enhance the supply of safety in the economy, the U.S. system is much less directed. The legal system, the subject of this article, plays an important role not only in discouraging breach but also in acting as a check on the discretionary authority of the regulator. In the end, the U.S. and the U.K. may have equally safe food systems, but what differs is the fundamental source of the safety supply. The practical implication is that safety in the food system emerges from several sources, not just through regulation. Therefore, direct importation of U.K.-style regulatory approaches may not be effective within a U.S. constitutional setting. Copyright 2007 International Association of Agricultural Economists.

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The role of party politics in medical malpractice tort reforms

Matter

Stutzer

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

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The U.S. tort system has experienced various reforms over the last three decades. While there is an extensive literature on the consequences of these reforms, very little is known about their determinants. In this study, we investigate the role of party politics in the reform process across U.S. states. In order to test whether any party effect goes beyond voter preferences, we apply the idea behind regression discontinuity studies based on close electoral outcomes to semi-parametric proportional hazards models. We find that in states with close election outcomes, a narrow Republican majority in the lower house is associated with a 50 to 150 percent higher risk of tort reform enactment compared to a narrow Democratic majority. Our results indicate that party politics plays a role in tort reforms goes over and above potential underlying preferences in the constituency. (JEL classification: D72, K13)

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Public Choice and Tort Reform

Cited by 8 publications

References 60 publications

Common law and economic efficiency

Common law and economic efficiency

Legal systems, institutional environment, and food safety

The role of party politics in medical malpractice tort reforms

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