Public Choice III

Mueller, Dennis C.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813771

Cited by 1,682 publications

(344 citation statements)

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“…In a given district, candidates converge on the policy position of the median voter, and in the legislature, the policy position of the median representative prevails. The conditions under which the median voter theorem holds are well known, such as a unidimensional issue space and single-peaked preferences (Mueller, 2003). Whether the conditions hold in practice is the subject of a lively scholarly literature, but there is a fair amount of evidence suggesting that it is not a bad first approximation.…”

Section: A Public Choice Model Of Districtingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public choice principles of redistricting

Gilligan

Matsusaka

2006

Public Choice

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Abstract. This paper uses fundamental principles of public choice, mainly the median voter theorem, to develop a simple theory of redistricting. The focus is on how closely policy outcomes correspond to majority rule. The main results are: (1) Potential policy bias in favor of nonmajority groups is structurally linked to the number of legislative seats and the population, and the structure of most states puts them very close to the theoretically maximum bias. (2) Random districting, which might seem like the essence of neutrality, does not eliminate policy bias on average. (3) Traditional principles of compact, contiguous districts that respect existing political boundaries, stressed in the Supreme Court's Shaw v. Reno decision, minimize the chance of nonmajoritarian outcomes. Our analysis also offers a gerrymandering explanation for the positive relation between seats and spending that is usually taken as support for the "Law of 1/n."

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Section: A Public Choice Model Of Districtingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public choice principles of redistricting

Gilligan

Matsusaka

2006

Public Choice

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“…This research builds on the public choice literature, implementation analysis, public finance, and contract theory (Buchanan and Tullock, 1961;Mueller, 2003;Wolf, 1988). A central insight of public choice theory is that policymakers will rarely have the interests or information to implement first-best policies (Downs, 1957;Meltzer and Richard, 1981;Riker, 1962).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Smarter Regulation with Improved Benefit-Cost Analysis

Hahn¹

2010

J Benefit Cost Analysis

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Benefit-cost analysis is required for many regulatory decisions in the United States and in other countries. In this paper, I examine a standard textbook model that is used in benefit-cost analysis as it is actually applied to environmental policy and other areas of regulation. My primary objective is to suggest how including some key factors in the analysis could promote the development of smarter regulation.I begin by presenting a standard economic model for government intervention in markets, which balances benefits and a narrow definition of costs. I then introduce a richer normative theory that considers several political and economic costs that are frequently not considered in analyzing real-world applications. Examples include costs associated with rent seeking, design and implementation, and raising revenues. The richer theory suggests that the government should supply less of a good, or ask the private sector to provide less of that good, than the standard economic model suggests. The reason is that intervening in markets is often more costly than the standard model assumes. In special cases, the theory provides guidance on the setting of socially optimal taxes and subsidies. I then explore how the theory needs to be modified in the presence of biased estimates of benefits and costs. I conclude with a discussion of how the theoretical framework can be applied to the actual design of regulatory policy.

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“…We follow standard concepts and notation of veto voting theory; see, e.g., [5], [6] Chapter 6, and [8] section 8.4. Let I = {i 1 , .…”

Section: Main Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Though majority voting procedures are much more common in the real-life committees than voting by veto, yet, the latter too has its pluses and proponents. "Thus, the [veto voting] procedure establishes incentives to make proposals that, although perhaps favouring oneself, stand relatively high in the other voters' preferences" [8], p.175.…”

Section: Main Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

War and peace in veto voting

Gurvich

2008

European Journal of Operational Research

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Public Choice III

Cited by 1,682 publications

References 0 publications

Public choice principles of redistricting

Public choice principles of redistricting

Designing Smarter Regulation with Improved Benefit-Cost Analysis

War and peace in veto voting

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