Public goods in networks

Bramoullé, Yann; Kranton, Rachel

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.006

Cited by 526 publications

(492 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

488

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…increasing or decreasing) and show that most of our results still hold. Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), the best-reply functions are linear, even though they use a general utility function and not a linear-quadratic one. For an interesting discussion on this issue, see Bramoullé et al (2009). (c) On top of its operational virtues, condition (A3) embodies the central assumption of our approach, the genericity of socialization efforts, not earmarked to particular targets.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social interactions and spillovers

Cabrales

Calvó‐Armengol

Zénou

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

109

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this paper is to provide a tractable model where both socialization (or network formation) and productive efforts can be analyzed simultaneously. This permits a fullfledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous productive efforts and heterogeneous agents. We show that there exist two stable interior equilibria, which we can Pareto rank. The socially efficient outcome lies between these two equilibria. When the intrinsic returns to production and socialization increase, all equilibrium actions decrease at the Pareto-superior equilibrium, while they increase at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. In both cases, the percentage change in socialization effort is higher (in absolute value) than that of the productive effort.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social interactions and spillovers

Cabrales

Calvó‐Armengol

Zénou

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

109

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In games of strategic complements, agents' preferences move together, while in games of strategic substitutes interactions and dynamics can be more complicated and existence and computation of equilibria can be significantly more challenging. Bramoullé and Kranton (2007b) provide an analysis of a class of such games, and show, among other things, that slight variations in network structure can lead to dramatic changes in equilibrium structure.…”

Section: Peer Interactions and Games On Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications

Jackson¹

2011

Handbook of Social Economics

216

147

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this chapter I provide an overview of research on social networks and their role in shaping behavior and economic outcomes. I include discussion of empirical and theoretical analyses of the role of social networks in markets and exchange, learning and diffusion, and network games. I also include some background on social network characteristics and measurements, models of network formation, models for the statistical analysis of social networks, as well as community detection.

show abstract

“…Our model differs from these for they are focused on strategic link formation and our analysis considers players are located in a fixed network. Several authors have also modeled games with strategic complements or substitutes on networks, see for example Angeletos and Pavan (2007), Ballester et al(2006), Ballester and Calvó-Armengol (2010), Bergemann and Morris (2009), Calvó-Armengol et al (2009), Bénabou (2008, Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), Ilkilic (2008), Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003), Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), andVives (1999). Our work belongs in this set of literature and complements it with the analysis of incomplete information and the characterization of the Bayesian-Nash equilibria.…”

Section: Relation To the Literature On Network Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

Hernández

Muñoz‐Herrera

Sánchez

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thresholds for switching action that relate to the two-player setup of the games. This structure of equilibria is considerably reduced when turning to incomplete information, in a setup in which players only know the distribution of the number of neighbors of the network. For high degrees of heterogeneity in the population the equilibria is such that every player can choose her preferred action, whereas if one of the identities is in the minority frustration ensues.

show abstract

Public goods in networks

Cited by 526 publications

References 22 publications

Social interactions and spillovers

Social interactions and spillovers

An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications

Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About