Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice Between Privacy and Publicity

Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.

doi:10.1257/mic.2.2.191

Cited by 56 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Lastly, our work contributes to the literature on anonymity in charitable contribution. A number of studies in recent years have noted the role of perception management and social image in pro-social behavior (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009;Daughety and Reinganum 2010). Our results indicate that these types of concerns similarly play into crowdfunder behavior, which in turn speaks to the presence of altruistic motives in online crowdfunding markets.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 62%

The Hidden Cost of Accommodating Crowdfunder Privacy Preferences: A Randomized Field Experiment

2015

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Online crowdfunding has received a great deal of attention from entrepreneurs and policymakers as a promising avenue to fostering entrepreneurship and innovation. A notable aspect of this shift from an offline to an online setting is that it brings increased visibility and traceability of transactions. Many crowdfunding platforms therefore provide mechanisms that enable a campaign contributor to conceal his or her identity or contribution amount from peers. We study the impact of these information (privacy) control mechanisms on crowdfunder behavior. Employing a randomized experiment at one of the world's largest online crowdfunding platforms, we find evidence of both positive (e.g., comfort) and negative (e.g., privacy priming) causal effects. We find that reducing access to information controls induces a net increase in fundraising, yet this outcome results from two competing influences -treatment increases willingness to engage with the platform (a 4.9% increase in the probability of contribution) and simultaneously decreases the average contribution (a $5.81 decline). This decline derives from a publicity effect, wherein contributors respond to a lack of privacy by tempering extreme contributions. We unravel the causal mechanisms that drive the results and discuss the implications of our findings for the design of online platforms.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 62%

The Hidden Cost of Accommodating Crowdfunder Privacy Preferences: A Randomized Field Experiment

2015

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“…While not temporally belonging to the first wave of privacy literature, Murphy (1995) and Daughety and Reinganum (2010) provide rebuttals to the Chicago School view. In particular, Daughety and Reinganum construct a model in which each individual cares about his reputation, but an individual's actions generate externalities (public good or bad).…”

Section: The First Wavementioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Privacy

Acquisti

Taylor²,

Wagman³

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

900

406

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“…x the only pure strategy signalling equilibria satisfying the intuitive criterion 14 can be summarised as:…”

Section: Corollary 1: Given a Threshold Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

How category reporting can improve fundraising

Cartwright

Patel

2013

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more than £ 1000, more than £ 10,000 etc. One naturally wonders how we should categorise donations and whether category reporting can raise more funds than simple uncategorised reporting. To shed light on these questions, we employ a signalling game framework in which both the donor's donation and his bene…ts of being in a higher category are determined endogenously. Our analysis suggests that categorised reporting can always improve fundraising. Indeed, we show that both a high and a low category threshold can increase donations. Categorised reporting, especially with a high threshold, can though also lead to the existence of a low donation equilibrium. Fundraisers may then have to choose between: a safer low threshold and a potentially more lucrative high threshold where they would also have to try to coordinate individuals on the desirable equilibrium.

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Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice Between Privacy and Publicity

Cited by 56 publications

References 32 publications

The Hidden Cost of Accommodating Crowdfunder Privacy Preferences: A Randomized Field Experiment

The Hidden Cost of Accommodating Crowdfunder Privacy Preferences: A Randomized Field Experiment

The Economics of Privacy

How category reporting can improve fundraising

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