Public health emergency response coordination: putting the plan into practice

The American Review of Public Administration

Wang

2020

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South Korea has experienced two national public health crises during this decade. The 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus (MERS-CoV) response’s failure to address coordination problems or authority conflicts provided an opportunity to revise its national disease control system before the 2020 coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis. Our reflection on Korea’s MERS-CoV and COVID-19 responses provides a perspective on public health emergency management. It is difficult to project the scale of an emerging infectious disease in advance because of its contagious nature and ability to cross geographic boundaries. In a national epidemic or global pandemic, a centralized coordination effort at the national level is desirable, rather than fragmented local, city, or regional efforts.

Section: South Korea’s Response Systems To Recent Coronavirus Outbreaksmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Uncoordinated Patchworks to a Coordinated System: MERS-CoV to COVID-19 in Korea

The American Review of Public Administration

Wang

2020

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“…We used 2 sources of data: online news articles published between May 20, 2015, and December 31, 2015, in 4 major newspapers in the country (the Kyunghyang Shinmun, the Hankyoreh, Dong-a Ilbo, and Hankook Ilbo) and the government's MERS white paper. 11,12 Other disaster studies have used news articles as a source to study disaster responses, 13,14 although we are unaware of any study on interorganizational coordination and collaboration in the context of HCIDs. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) published the MERS white paper in December 2016, which is a comprehensive document that includes after-event research by a group in the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA).…”

Section: Data Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interorganizational Coordination and Collaboration During the 2015 MERS-CoV Response in South Korea

Disaster med. public health prep.

et al. 2020

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Objectives: This study examined the way organizations were involved in the response to the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV, MERS) outbreak that occurred in Korea in 2015. Data and Methods: We collected organizational network data through a content analysis of online news articles and the government’s white paper. Social network analysis was used to analyze the key organizations and their connections in crucial response tasks. Results: Three national health authorities (Central MERS Management Headquarters [CMMH], Korea Centers for Disease Control [KCDC], Ministry of Health and Welfare [MOHW]) led the response. CMMH, which did not appear in the government’s response plans, played a significant role in all 3 networks. KCDC also was involved in all 3 networks, but was most prominent in the laboratory testing network. MOHW appeared only in the patient management network. Each health authority coordinated and collaborated with distinctive types of organizations in the networks, but unclear lines of responsibilities also were found. Conclusions: The study demonstrated that the roles and responsibilities of health authorities at the national level were fragmented and lacked clarity. Public health emergency preparedness must consider carefully the way to establish collaborative response systems.

“…Because of the difficulty acquiring appropriate data and inferential techniques, little research has been conducted on the network changes in emergency management [28]. In this paper, we use the response manual dataset Kim, Ku, and Oh collected and analyzed [20]. However, unlike Kim and her colleagues, we examine the critical components of tie formation in the network planned by examining particular types of actors and activities during different stages of the epidemic.…”

Section: Emergency Response Plans 21 Emergency Planning and Writtenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The response manuals were designed to direct coordinated efforts among key stakeholder organizations in the four critical tasks during the disease outbreak⎯reporting suspected cases, laboratory testing, epidemiological investigation, and patient management [20] [21] [22]. These tasks involve transferring information, specimens, equipment, human resources, or patients between organizations because different organizations possess different resources, skills, and knowledge.…”

Section: Response Coordination Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To understand the way the Korean government's efforts ended with unwanted outcomes, one must ask how the efforts to coordinate key stakeholder organizations were planned as well as implemented [20]. While limited, this study analyzes planned coordination networks among key stakeholder organizations in the nine versions of the MERS response manual as the epidemic progressed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Epidemic Response Coordination Networks in “Living Documents”

Wang

Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

Oh³

2020

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Response plans developed thoroughly are suggestive of a successful action, but there is a gap in the literature with respect to the way concerted efforts among organizations are planned and change during crises. Using organizational network data extracted from the South Korean government's MERS response manuals, we examined the changes in the response coordination network planned during the epidemic's distinct stages. The greatest difference in predicting tie formation was found in the networks planned before the event and revised during the outbreak. Local and governmental actors tend to form more ties consistently in the revised manuals. Two actors that are intended to transfer medical and/or personnel resources tend to form more ties across all stages. These findings suggest that transferring material and/or human resources are key activities in the epidemic response and planners tend to increase the connection of local and governmental actors over time.