Dual receiver encryption (DRE), a notion of public key encryption (PKE) introduced at CCS'04, allows two independent receivers to decrypt a ciphertext into a same plaintext. This crypto primitive is quite useful in designing denial of service attack‐resilient protocols. To our knowledge, prior DRE constructions are considered in the traditional PKE settings, which may face the difficulty of certificate management. This paper aiming at solving this dilemma of DRE in the traditional PKE settings, and gives an identity‐based variant version of DRE: identity‐based dual receiver encryption (ID‐DRE) that combines the notion of DRE and identity‐based encryption (IBE). Based on Waters' IBE (Crypto'05), two ID‐DRE schemes are constructed in the standard model and by partitioning methodology, provable security of our ID‐DRE schemes are obtained under the decisional bilinear Diffie‐Hellman. Furthermore, we achieve a tighter reduction by adopting a random walk‐like methodology of analysis on the lower bound of simulators' artificial abort, which also results in better security tightness for Waters IBE. This improved result
scriptO(n·q) for Waters' IBE, where n is the bitlength of messages and q is the number of adversarial key queries, is consistent with Hofheinz and Kiltz's result (Crypto'08). Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.