Public opinion regarding economic and cultural globalization: evidence from a cross-national survey

Edwards, Martin S.

doi:10.1080/09692290600839857

Cited by 34 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…For these scholars, support is largely determined by an individual's set of 'relatively stable symbolic predispositions' (Fordham and Kleinberg, 2012: 312). Support has been explained in terms of 'nationalistic attitudes' (e.g., Mayda and Rodrik, 2005), individual attachment to national sovereignty and conceptions of national identity, existing national identities and cultures (e.g., De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005;Kriesi and Lachat, 2004), and general value orientations (e.g., Edwards, 2006). Similarly, research focusing specifically on the EU shows that individuals with 'multiple identities' (those who identify as both French and Spanish or French and European, for instance), 'inclusive identities' (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 424), or so-called communal identities shaped by a common liberal democratic constitution like the European treaties (Bruter, 2004) feel less threatened by EU integration and therefore tend to be more supportive of European integration.…”

Section: Fiscal Redistribution and Citizen Support For Regional Integmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal redistribution and public support for European integration

Chalmers

Dellmuth

2015

European Union Politics

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This article contributes to existing debates on public opinion towards European integration by examining when and why fiscal transfers and public support are systematically related. Drawing on economic and identity-related theories, we develop and test hypotheses about the links between EU fiscal transfers among countries and subnational jurisdictions, and citizens' support for European integration. Using a three-level analysis of residents in 143 regions in 16 EU member states, we find a positive effect of EU transfers among both countries and subnational jurisdictions on support for European integration among those with a European communal identity. We also find that this effect increases the more politically aware individuals are. The article sketches the broader implications of our findings for public opinion research on regional integration beyond the European Union.

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Section: Fiscal Redistribution and Citizen Support For Regional Integmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal redistribution and public support for European integration

Chalmers

Dellmuth

2015

European Union Politics

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“…Much previous survey research seeking to understand these issues has focused on public opinion towards immigration within each host society; for example, Zan Strabac and Ola Listhaug (2008) used the European Social Survey to examine prejudicial attitudes towards ethnic minority populations, while Costas Panagopoulos (2006) examined American attitudes towards Muslims and Arab‐Americans in the aftermath of 9/11. Studies have also analyzed public attitudes in Western countries towards the related topics of labor mobility, trade liberalization and economic protectionism (Edwards, 2006; Kaltenthaler et al ., 2004; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). Gallya Lahav (2004) examines European preferences for particular types of immigration policy, at mass and elite levels, showing that many Europeans find immigrants to be threatening.…”

Section: Comparative Framework Evidence and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations

2012

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To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given society. Part I considers theories about the impact of growing social diversity in Western nations. We classify two categories of society: ORIGINS (defined as Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, including twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (defined as Western Countries of Destination for Muslim migrants, including twenty-two OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations).1 Using this framework, we demonstrate that on average, the basic social values of Muslim migrants fall roughly mid-way between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination. We conclude that Muslim migrants do not move to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host culture, as assimilation theories suggest.

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“… 18. Edwards 2006; Guisinger 2014; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004; Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013; Lindsey and Lake 2014; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001; Rathbun 2016. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?

Rho¹,

Tomz²

2017

Int Org

251

195

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The dominant approach to the study of international political economy assumes that the policy preferences of individuals and groups reflect economic self-interest. Recent research has called this assumption into question by suggesting that voters do not have economically self-interested preferences about trade policy. We investigate one potential explanation for this puzzling finding: economic ignorance. We show that most voters do not understand the economic consequences of protectionism. We then use experiments to study how voters would respond if they had more information about how trade barriers affect the distribution of income. We find that distributional cues generate two opposing effects: they make people more likely to express self-serving policy preferences, but they also make people more sensitive to the interests of others. In our study both reactions were evident, but selfish responses outweighed altruistic ones. Thus, if people knew more about the distributional effects of trade, the correlation between personal interests and policy preferences would tighten. By showing how the explanatory power of economic self-interest depends on beliefs about causality, this research provides a foundation for more realistic, behaviorally informed theories of international political economy.Over the past two decades, open-economy politics (OEP) has emerged as the dominant paradigm in the field of international political economy. Scholars working in this tradition reason "from the most micro-to the most macro-level." 1 They use economic theory to derive the policy preferences of individuals and groups within a country, and then investigate how political institutions and international bargaining translate preferences into actual policies. Initially developed to explain trade policy, OEP has been extended to many other issues, including international monetary policy, capital controls, foreign investment, foreign aid, and immigration. 2 Today OEP is recognized as the principal approach to international political economy in the United States, and it has transformed scholarship in other parts of the world as well. 3 We are grateful for helpful comments from many colleagues, including

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Public opinion regarding economic and cultural globalization: evidence from a cross-national survey

Cited by 34 publications

References 20 publications

Fiscal redistribution and public support for European integration

Fiscal redistribution and public support for European integration

Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations

Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?

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