Public Party Funding and Party Transformation in Multiparty Systems

Abstract

This article analyzes the changes in the Israeli party system since the inception of public party funding in 1969 and compares them with party transformations elsewhere with a view to comparing the intended and the actual impacts of such funding on multiparty systems. Although the overall effect is in line with the catch-all thesis of Kirchheimer, Epstein, and others, there are important potential consequences that run counter to it. Chief among them is the greater facility of ideological and sectional new parties to establish themselves. The result can be a far-reaching structural transformation of the party system, with voters presented with a wide choice of competing ideological and catch-all parties.

Political Competition and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe

“…Governments thus seek self-constraints and guarantees for all parties, rather than benefits for governing parties alone. Well-regulated and equitable state funding of parties guarantees the futures of the parliamentary parties without unduly privileging any one (Mendilow, 1992). Even if some parties attempt to treat their role in government as a door to patronage, others can hold in check these rent seekers.…”

The Influence of Romanian Campaign Finance Laws on Party System Development and Corruption

“…A related argument is that the party campaign finance law becomes a shield for parties in which they extract larger and larger sums of money from the state. Mendilow (1992) reports that in the case of Italy in the mid-1970s public funding nearly doubled, and in Israel the major parties after 1988 passed an amendment to the party campaign finance legislation to allow the expenditure ceiling to be increased retroactively. 4 Schleth and Pinto-Duschinsky (1970) report that the large increase in campaign expenditures between 1961 and 1969 in West Germany could be attributed to the creation of public subsidies.…”

“…Indeed, Katz and Mair's (1995) concept of the cartel party and cartel party system is based on the collusion of parliamentary parties to provide state subsidies in order to prevent the establishment of new parties. As an example, Mendilow (1992) discusses how the Austrian government significantly curtailed the equal party subsidy once the ruling party no longer needed additional coalition members.…”

“…7 The tendency of party centralization is less severe in federal systems, but is still considered a consequence of party campaign finance. For example, Mendilow (1992) argues that all party national headquarters in Israel were strengthened following the first campaign held under party campaign finance. This de-emphasis on the local party organization is also one of the defining features of a cartel party.…”

“…However, the relationship between campaign finance laws and party system development has received far less attention. Most of the recent research that has been conducted on the relationship between campaign finance and party development tends to explore these linkages in Western countries (Katz and Mair, 1995;Mendilow, 1992;Van Biezen, 2000). Few works have focused on the influence of East European campaign finance laws on party system development (Kopecky, 1995).…”