2012
DOI: 10.2753/pmr1530-9576350408
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Public-Private Partnerships, Public Authorities, and Democratic Governance

Abstract: This case explores public-private partnerships in Omaha, Nebraska, where substantial private donations were received for the construction of two cityowned facilities: a convention center/arena and a baseball stadium. The donors required creation of a new public authority to undertake the construction and operation of the projects. This article analyzes key issues related to the decision to enter into the partnerships, contract terms, risk-sharing, transparency, and accountability. It also identifies several im… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…because property rights of public goods and services are frequently unclear, it is nearly impossible to distribute policy benefits perfectly fairly (balla, 2004). however, conflicts of interest arising from distributive disappointment can be mitigated if interest groups feel that their legitimate rights are acknowledged by transparent and fair procedures (landow & Ebdon, 2012;lens, 2007;Schneider, Scholz, lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003;Velotti, botti, & Vesci, 2012). In this respect, procedurally open public meetings can make participants believe that the agency is responsive to public concerns (halvorsen, 2003), thereby increasing stakeholders' acceptance of policy outcomes (Mccomas et al, 2010) and legitimating agency decisions (Richardson, Sherman, & gismondi, 1993).…”
Section: Public Meetings As Open Low-cost Interaction Venuesmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…because property rights of public goods and services are frequently unclear, it is nearly impossible to distribute policy benefits perfectly fairly (balla, 2004). however, conflicts of interest arising from distributive disappointment can be mitigated if interest groups feel that their legitimate rights are acknowledged by transparent and fair procedures (landow & Ebdon, 2012;lens, 2007;Schneider, Scholz, lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003;Velotti, botti, & Vesci, 2012). In this respect, procedurally open public meetings can make participants believe that the agency is responsive to public concerns (halvorsen, 2003), thereby increasing stakeholders' acceptance of policy outcomes (Mccomas et al, 2010) and legitimating agency decisions (Richardson, Sherman, & gismondi, 1993).…”
Section: Public Meetings As Open Low-cost Interaction Venuesmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…However, the government cannot be the sole problem solver-there are advantages to collaboration when markets are already functioning. Furthermore, private organizations and other actors have a shared interest in financial system outcomes that influence their bottom line (Landow and Ebdon 2012).…”
Section: The Great Recession and The Relative Speed Of Recoverymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Different forms may give certain actors privileged access to and control over resources, and alter or disrupt pathways of political recognition (Eaton and Weir 2015; Hacker 2002; Howard 1997; Mettler 2011). Different forms also have distinct implications for government accountability, equity, and risk (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011; Freeman and Minow 2009; Landow and Ebdon 2012). Understanding why policymakers choose one of these forms over another is therefore an important question, with potentially far-reaching social and political consequences.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In most cases, they find that doing so offers a pragmatic solution to the problems of governance. For example, associational policies allow officials to reduce costs (Landow and Ebdon 2012; Rosenau 1999), draw on the administrative capacity of the private sector (Clemens 2006; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011; Frasure and Jones-Correa 2010; Moore 2011), and overcome institutional or political roadblocks (Clemens 2006; Hacker 2002; Hawley 1966; Howard 1997; Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011), including ideological objections to the expansion of central state power (Balogh 2015; Hawley 1974). Despite this interest, scholars have yet to examine why officials choose one associational policy form over another.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%