Public–private versus public ownership and economic performance: evidence from Italian local utilities

Abstract

In the last century local public services have often been reformed. The declared outcome of the most recent reforms is the privatization and liberalization of the sector. However, in almost all European countries, the privatization of local public services has been only partial, because local governments have sought to privatise a minority stake in the public owned-companies, while remaining committed to retaining public ownership and control over the longer-term as a means of protecting public interest. The phenomenon of mixed public–private companies emerged as a result of this process. In this context, the article investigates whether differences in financial performance can be found between public–private companies and totally public-owned enterprises. Empirical quantitative studies on this particular topic are quite lacking at the moment. The present study tries to fill this gap through an empirical analysis on a sample of 623 Italian local utilities. The results of the study suggest that there are differences in economic performance between local utility companies with varying degrees of public ownership. In particular, public–private utilities show better economic performance than publicly owned firms, especially in terms of profitability. The results also seem to suggest that the majority private ownership is not necessary for better performance. In other terms, public–private partnership—and not private majority ownership—seems to be the key point for good performance

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