Public procurement mechanisms for public-private partnerships

Abstract

Why do some countries (often developing and emerging economies) adopt special laws on PPP, whilst in others PPPs are governed by the legislation on public procurement and related bylaws? This paper explains the above global discrepancies from an institutional perspective. In a contract-theoretical framework we demonstrate how PPPs can enable projects that are not feasible through standard public procurement arrangements. Incentives for private partners are created through extra benefits (often non-contractible) from their collaboration with the government (e.g. risk reduction, reputational gains, access to additional resources, lower bureaucratic burden, etc.). In a well-developed institutional environment these benefits are implicitly guaranteed, suggesting no need in a specialized PPP-enabling legislation. Otherwise, a PPP law should establish an institutional architecture to provide the above benefits.

Public-private partnerships in an economists eye: a gleam or a beam?

“…Contributions of the public and of the private parties do not need to be limited to labour, capital and materials; additionally, the private party provides valuable managerial skills ensuring efficiency. The most common resources supplied by the public partner include land, access to funding, and human capital that brings in specialized knowledge and expertise (Besley and Ghatak, 2001) as well as administrative experience and skills (Mahalingam et al, 2011), particularly with respect to reducing compliance and red-tape costs (Vinogradov et al, 2014). Does it matter who owns the enterprise that provides the public good?…”

“…Hodge and Greve (2007) note that the interdependence and equality in decision-making as well as equal benefits to parties, constitute an important aspect of partnerships. From an economics perspective, if contracts are incomplete, objectives of parties may diverge, which helps justify partnerships by their ability to "increase efficiency by aligning the incentives of the parties" (Grout, 2003;Vinogradov et al, 2014;Vinogradov and Shadrina, 2018a).…”

Issues of Economically Most Advantageous Tender in Procuring Pfi Projects and Suggestions for Improvement

“…(1) 既存研究のレビュー 既存の研究において，入札方式全般の視点からは Albano et al 3) ，Asker et al 4) 5) ，De Boer et al 6) ，Mateus et al 7) ， Pauw et al 8) ，Rendon et al 9) ，Vinogradov et al 10) ，Waara et al 11) が挙げられる．これらは主に，各国の入札における制度 的課題を挙げ，その改善方法を指摘するものである．特 に，調達規則に基づき発注者側が事業者選定基準に対す るアカウンタビリティをより明確化するべきであるとす る主張が多く見られる． また，総合評価方式全般の視点では，Bergman et al 12) ， Lahdenperä 13) ，Perng et al 14) ，Tsai et al 15…”

Public-Private Partnership as Tool for Developing Regional Labor Potential

“…The mechanisms of public-private partner ship provide an opportunity for realization of projects that would be impossible to realize, if private or public sector worked alone [10]. PPP is an innovative approach to relations between the public and private sectors which cooperate to develop the infrastructure and deliver public services, sharing risks, losses and advantages [11].…”