Public Reactions to Noncompliance with Judicial Orders

Abstract

Constitutions empower people to ask judges for binding orders directing state agents to remedy rights violations, but state agents do not always comply. Scholars propose that by making it easier to observe noncompliance, courts can leverage public pressure for compliance when it exists. Yet, exposure to information about noncompliance might lead individuals to accept high levels of noncompliance and reduce support for judicial remedies. We estimate the rate of noncompliance with judges’ orders via a rigorous tracking study of the Colombian tutela. We then embed this rate in three survey experiments fielded with online national quota samples. We show that people find the noncompliance rate in the tutela highly unacceptable regardless of a variety of mitigating factors. We also show that public reactions to this information depend on prior expectations, a finding that stresses the importance of scholarship in cognitive psychology for studies of compliance in law and politics.

Education, public support for institutions, and the separation of powers

“…When citizens support their courts, the threat of electoral punishment may compel political actors to comply with courts' rulings (e.g., Vanberg, 2015). Courts' ability to induce compliance with their decision-making can be broadly understood as judicial power (e.g., Staton, 2010) and a recent scholarship has endeavored to explore the extent of public support for such power (e.g., Bartels and Kramon, 2020;Bartels et al, 2021;Carlin et al, 2022).…”

“…While education may increase public support for courts, if it results in similar increases in public support for the executive (legislature), citizens are not inclined to punish the executive (legislature) when it disobeys a court. Providing evidence for the relationship between education and public support across political institutions would further build upon the burgeoning empirical literature on the extent and efficacy of judicial power (e.g., Bartels and Kramon, 2020;Bartels et al, 2021;Carlin et al, 2022).…”

CompLaw: A Coding Protocol and Database for the Comparative Study of Judicial Review

“…rights claims (Epp 1998;Sieder, Schjolden and Angell 2005); once accessed, what explains the decisions courts reach and the methods of interpretation they use (Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla 2008;Helmke 2005;Lasser 2004;Kapiszewski 2012); following a resolution, what explains differences in the implementation of court orders (Vanberg 2005;Carlin et al 2022); and, ultimately, why are some courts able to constrain governments while others are not (Alter 2009).…”