Public reason: A stranger in non-liberal and religious societies?

Abstract

The article contributes to the discussion of political reasoning in general, and public reason in particular, analysed from the vantage point of comparative political theory. It aims to bring out the complexity and diversity of actual political reasoning, and it serves as a corrective to some over-simplified discussions of public reason, by defenders and critics alike. I argue that the notion of public reason can be extended to and is operative in non-liberal and religious societies, with the acknowledgment that it needs to undergo a methodological metamorphosis in the process. This requires what I call multiple justificatory strategy, which allows the use of different justifications in order to respond to the plurality existing in society. However, there are certain qualifications in the use of multiple justifications. I argue that this leads to two important conclusions, (a) that the functioning of an inclusive notion of public reason requires the strategy of multiple justifications, and (b) it contests the inclusivists' argument of the end or superfluity of public reason.

Disaggregating Civility: Politeness, Public-Mindedness and Their Connection

“…However, perhaps this is an incorrect and overly narrow understanding of the constraints of public reason. For example, in a later formulation of his idea of public reason, the so-called ‘wide view’, Rawls (2005, 453) himself argued that non-public reasons (including religious ones) could be included in public deliberation ‘provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support’. This would seem to contradict the idea that when a person employs religious reasons to advance morally civil goals, they are being uncivil from a justificatory perspective.…”

“…It could be argued that in these societies moral civility involves the affirmation of a different type of moral relationship than is the case in liberal-democratic societies, i.e., one that includes toleration and non-discrimination but not the recognition of others as free and equal. Likewise, while the kind of justificatory civility that we discuss in this article is inherently liberal, norms of public reason and public justification can also exist in non-liberal societies (see, e.g., Salam 2019). In these contexts, therefore, justificatory civility will look different from what it is in liberal-democratic societies.…”

“…For example, we often assess and judge others' level of compliance with norms of politeness and etiquette, expressing disappointment if they are rude. Similarly, some believe that we should express moral disapproval and social stigma towards those who fail to comply with the constraints of justificatory civility (e.g., Rawls 2005, 445). However, in both cases, appraisal respect seems to concern the assessment of others' civility (or lack thereof) rather than the civility of the person who is doing the appraisal.…”

Conspiracism and Civility

“…For example, in what Rawls (1999) calls ‘decent’ societies, civility may involve toleration and non-discrimination but not the recognition of others as free and equal. Similarly, norms of justificatory civility can also exist in non-liberal societies (see, for example, Salam, 2019). For an analysis of these points, see Bardon et al (2022: 6).…”