Public Support for U.S. Military Operations

Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions

“…Mueller (1973) proposed that US casualties in the Korean and Vietnam wars were associated with a decline in domestic support for the war. Subsequent work, including Larson (1996); Gartner and Segura (1998); Gartner (2008); Segura and Gartner (2021); Karol and Miguel (2007); Hayes and Myers (2009) found additional evidence consistent with this argument. In contrast, Jentleson (1992); Larson (1996); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Burk (1999); Dauber (2001); Klarevas (2002) ;Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009); Lacquement (2004) challenged these early findings, citing numerous cases where casualties and public support appear uncorrelated.…”

“…Subsequent work, including Larson (1996); Gartner and Segura (1998); Gartner (2008); Segura and Gartner (2021); Karol and Miguel (2007); Hayes and Myers (2009) found additional evidence consistent with this argument. In contrast, Jentleson (1992); Larson (1996); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Burk (1999); Dauber (2001); Klarevas (2002) ;Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009); Lacquement (2004) challenged these early findings, citing numerous cases where casualties and public support appear uncorrelated. Fazal (2021) finds no relationship between casualty numbers and sentiment in an experimental setting with a hypothetical deployment to Syria.…”

Capitolul 5

“…În parte, un produs al intervențiilor controversate și îndelungate din Afganistan și Irak, în condițiile în care interesul pentru problemele interne, îndeosebi economia, este mai important decât pentru chestiunile referitoare la securitatea națională în sens restrâns (Carden 2018;Financial Times 2021;Pewb 2022). Dar atitudinea publicului american față de pierderi este mai subtilă decât pare și nu corespunde prejudecăților adversarilor săi; acesta poate fi favorabil intervențiilor externe, chiar și costisitoare, dacă succesul pare probabil, cauza este morală, iar amenințările sunt importante (Larson 1996;Dill, Schubinger 2021). Inițial, acțiunile militare în Irak au beneficiat de aprobare și încurajare; în cazul Afganistanului, opinia a devenit mai curând defavorabilă după executarea lui Osama Ben Laden (Harting, Doherty 2021).…”

The Limit of American Public Support for Military Intervention

“…Of the three dimensions, motivation, or the principal objective, is the most fundamental: it gives purpose to a costly undertaking and is an important determinant of the base level of public support for military actions (Eichenberg, 2005;Jentleson, 1992;Jentleson & Britton, 1998); however, particular forms and mandates are the strategies to serve the purpose. This theoretical framework that we propose and employ in the rest of the study follows a long tradition that sees the public as rational and reasoning, basing their support for a foreign policy on a cost-benefit analysis (Aldrich et al, 2006;Eichenberg, 2005;Gelpi et al, 2009;Jentleson, 1992;Jentleson & Britton, 1998;Larson, 1996). Moreover, our framework provides an easy correspondence between the three dimensions and the main determinants of public support for use of force found in the literature, and thus facilitates comparisons of our findings with those of the existing studies.…”