Publicity, reciprocity, and incentives

Lister, Andrew

doi:10.1017/can.2019.11

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…The idea that just conditionality is itself conditional makes sense if we think in terms of reciprocity conditions on duties. I can’t insist on you being willing to fulfil a particular duty with respect to me as condition on my fulfilling that duty with respect to you, if in the past I have inexcusably neglected a whole series of other duties to you (Lister, 2020: 9). Yet that is the scenario, if some citizens are unjustly relegated to a position of social and economic inferiority and powerlessness.…”

Section: Equality Instead Of Reciprocity?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income

Lister

2020

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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This article reconsiders the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income based on the idea that reciprocity is not only a duty but a limiting condition on other duties. If the objection were that unconditionality invites people to neglect contributory obligations arising from a duty of reciprocity, people could ask to opt out of eligibility for the benefit so as to avoid liability to contribution. While market failure provides a reason for mandatory participation in social insurance, it will not justify the generous (if conditional) income support egalitarians favour. To sustain the objection, we need to think of reciprocity a limit on duties of assistance and fair-sharing. In this form, the objection resists the inherited assets response, which holds that we can’t have a duty reciprocate benefits we receive from nature or from previous generations.

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Section: Equality Instead Of Reciprocity?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 3. The next four paragraphs draw on Lister (2020: 9–12). The idea of a reciprocity condition on duties of justice can be found in Rawls, though his acceptance of such a limitation is camouflaged by his focus on a well-ordered society, whose members act in accordance with just rules ‘for the most part’ Rawls (1999a: 4).…”

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Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income

Lister

2020

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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11. The Self-Respect Argument for Limitarianism

Neuhäuser

2023

Having Too Much

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Limitarianism is the view that justice requires the limitation of wealth, at least under certain conditions. In its original form the view was developed by Ingrid Robeyns and normatively justified by the use of two arguments, the democratic argument and the argument from unmet urgent needs. In this chapter I want to contribute to the justification of limitarianism by providing a novel argument for limitarianism which is distinct from the two arguments developed by Robeyns. This argument is based on self-respect as a primary basic good. According to this argument, limitarianism is needed to protect the social basis of self-respect of all members of society so that they can develop a sense of self-worth and pursue their personal projects. Since this kind of self-respect is a more important basic good than wealth above a certain threshold, limitarianism can be justified either as a principle of justice or as a direct policy implication of the principles of justice, if it turns out to be required to secure the social basis of self-respect.

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11. El argumento del autorrespeto a favor del limitarismo

Neuhäuser

2024

Tener Demasiado

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El limitarismo es la perspectiva de que la justicia requiere que se limite la riqueza, al menos bajo ciertas condiciones. En su forma original, Ingrid Robeyns desarrolló y justificó normativamente esta perspectiva usando dos argumentos: el argumento democrático y el argumento de las necesidades urgentes insatisfechas. En este capítulo, quiero contribuir a la justificación del limitarismo proporcionando un argumento novedoso a favor del limitarismo que es distinto de los dos argumentos desarrollados por Robeyns. Este argumento está basado en el autorrespeto como un bien básico primario. De acuerdo con este argumento, el limitarismo es necesario para proteger la base social del autorrespeto de todos los miembros de la sociedad, de tal manera que puedan desarrollar un sentido de valor propio y puedan perseguir sus proyectos personales. Ya que este tipo de autorrespeto es un bien básico más importante que la riqueza por encima de cierto umbral, el limitarismo puede justificarse ya sea como un principio de justicia o como una implicación política directa de los principios de justicia, si resulta necesario para asegurar la base social del autorrespeto.

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Publicity, reciprocity, and incentives

Cited by 3 publications

References 36 publications

Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income

Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income

11. The Self-Respect Argument for Limitarianism

11. El argumento del autorrespeto a favor del limitarismo

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