Punishing Political Offenders: The Effect of Political Motive on Federal Sentencing Decisions*

Abstract

Although political motive is frequently avoided as an issue in the prosecution of terrorists, previous research indicates that these offenders consistently receive longer sentences than nonterrorists convicted of similar offenses (Smith, 1994). This study assesses the ability of three theoretical models (consensus, conflict, and structural‐contextual) to explain these differences in sentencing patterns. Data on terrorists (N = 95), provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission, is matched with data on a sample of similarly convicted nonterrorists from the Federal Court Cases Integrated Data Base, 1970‐1991 (N = 403). Controlling for a number of demographic and sentencing‐related variables, the results indicate that the official label of “terrorist” is not only a significant predictor of sentence length, but emerges as the dominant explanatory variable in the analysis. The results provide general support for both consensus and conflict hypotheses, but only partial support for structural‐contextual theory. The findings also raise procedural questions regarding the extensive variation in sentencing between similarly situated defendants when political motive is used as a primary criterion for sentence enhancements.

Punishing Terrorists

“…Complete data were available on 111 convicted terrorists and 482 convicted nonterrorists. Results from analyses of these samples have been previously reported elsewhere (Smith & Damphousse, 1996, 1998.…”

“…2 During sentencing hearings, the lack of jury influence, the absence of cross-examination, and the decreased standard of proof to ''preponderance of the evidence'' gave prosecutors the opportunity to introduce terrorist information. This tactic resulted in federally indicted terrorists receiving sentences that were more than three times longer than nonterrorists for the same offense (Smith & Damphousse, 1996). Prosecutors appear to have been motivated to charge terrorist offenders using lesser statutes (which ultimately results in greater certainty of conviction and longer sentence lengths) rather than having to obtain convictions under more serious statutes that require a higher burden of proof during the trial phase (Smith, Damphousse, Yang, & Ginther, 2005).…”

Patterns of precursor behaviors in the life span of a U.S. environmental terrorist group

“…Smith and Damphousse, 1996). Similarly, passage of the 1996 antiterrorism and effective Death penalty act resulted in significant increases in prosecutions and convictions for providing material support to international terrorist groups, particularly following the 9/11 attacks (Smith and Damphousse, 1998).…”

Build a Criminal Justice Policy for Terrorism

“…Although thus far little research has been done on this topic, a concern with both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system in the processing of criminal suspects has long been a central concern of criminology. An example of this type of research applied to terrorist suspects is provided in a series of studies by Smith and his colleagues (Smith andDamphousse, 1996, 2002), who have examined the arrest, prosecution, and punishment of terrorists in the United States. Similarly, in research currently under way, Weisburd (2007) is studying Israeli police responses to terrorist attacks and is examining the extent to which counter-terrorist policing affects more traditional community-oriented policing methods and practices.…”