Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation

Ozono, Hiroki; Kamijo, Yoshio; Shimizu, Kazumi

doi:10.1038/s41598-017-13918-8

Cited by 28 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For instance, it was found that pool punishment can stabilize cooperation if second-order free riders are also punished [21,22]. In addition, the secondorder free-riding problem was analyzed in [23][24][25].…”

Section: Sanctioning Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For simplicity, we will drop the arguments in g( f , z, d) and write simply g. To characterize the equilibrium point at the interior of the simplex, we consider the Jacobian of System (24), which has the following form:…”

Section: Effect Of D In the Interior Equilibrium Pointmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Next, we analyze the case of the Jacobian matrix J perturbed by the parameter d. To this end, we consider that d ≈ 0. It is important to remark the implicit dependence of the matrices J R and J T on the parameter d. (24) denoted by J and decomposed as J = J R + dJ T with entries J R ij and J T ij for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with bounded derivatives. Suppose also an initial equilibrium point (f 0 ,ẑ 0 ) of System (24) that corresponds to the parameter d = 0, and another equilibrium point for 0 < d denoted by (f d ,ẑ d ).…”

Section: Effect Of D In the Interior Equilibrium Pointmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Botta

Blanco

Schaerer

2021

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Improving and maintaining cooperation are fundamental issues for any project to be time-persistent, and sanctioning free riders may be the most applied method to achieve it. However, the application of sanctions differs from one group (project or institution) to another. We propose an optional, public good game model where a randomly selected set of the free riders is punished. To this end, we introduce a parameter that establishes the portion of free riders sanctioned with the purpose to control the population state evolution in the game. This parameter modifies the phase portrait of the system, and we show that, when the parameter surpasses a threshold, the full cooperation equilibrium point becomes a stable global attractor. Hence, we demonstrate that the fractional approach improves cooperation while reducing the sanctioning cost.

show abstract

Section: Sanctioning Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Effect Of D In the Interior Equilibrium Pointmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Effect Of D In the Interior Equilibrium Pointmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Botta

Blanco

Schaerer

2021

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In larger-scale societies, it can be effective to establish systems other than peer reward and punishment. The pool punishment system and/or the leader support system are important candidates for solving the problem [27][28][29][30][31][32] . The limitations of peer reward and punishment emphasize the importance of investigation into how these systems emerge and are maintained.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

Ozono

Kamijo

Shimizu

2020

Sci Rep

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cooperation in social dilemmas can be sustained if individuals are effectively rewarded or punished from peers within the group. However, as group size increases, we inevitably face localization, in which a global group is divided into several localized groups. in such societies, members can reward and punish only neighbors within the same localized group, while cooperation for social dilemmas should be solved through global group involvement. in this situation, the global group and the local group are not always equal in terms of welfare, and situations can arise in which cooperation is beneficial for the global group but not for the local group. We predict that in such a locally inefficient situation, peer reward and punishment cannot function to sustain global cooperation. We conducted an experiment in which 16 group members played a public goods game incorporating peer reward and punishment. We manipulated the range of peer reward and punishment (only local members/all global members) and payoff structure (locally efficient/locally inefficient). We found that high cooperation was not achieved and that peer reward and punishment did not function when, and only when, the group was divided into localized groups and the payoff structure was locally inefficient.

show abstract

“…Many studies explored the conditions under which cooperation is evolutionarily stable. However, a number of theoretical and experimental studies have found that free riders can also gain if there are perfect cooperators who cooperate unconditionally, allowing free riders to invade cooperative regimes [13][14][15][16][17][18] . For this reason, researchers call perfect cooperators second-order free riders and are interested in eliminating them.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Two ways to overcome the three social dilemmas of indirect reciprocity

Okada

2020

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Indirect reciprocity is one of the main principles of evolving cooperation in a social dilemma situation. In reciprocity, a positive score is given to cooperative behaviour while a negative score is given to non-cooperative behaviour, and the dilemma is resolved by selectively cooperating only with those with positive scores. However, many studies have shown that non-cooperation with those who have not cooperated also downgrades one's reputation; they have called this situation the scoring dilemma. To address this dilemma, the notion of justified punishments has been considered. The notion of justified punishment allows good individuals who defect against bad co-players to keep their standing. Despite numerous studies on justified punishment, it is unknown whether this solution leads to a new type of dilemma because reputations may be downgraded when the intent of punishment is not correctly communicated. The dilemma of punishment has so far been rarely analysed, and thus, the complete solution of the mechanism for evolving cooperation using the principle of indirect reciprocity has not been found yet. Here, we identify sufficient conditions to overcome each of the three dilemmas including the dilemma of punishment to maintain stable cooperation by using the framework of evolutionary game theory. This condition includes the principle of detecting free riders, which resolves the social dilemma, the principle of justification, which resolves the scoring dilemma, and the principle of generosity, which resolves the dilemma of punishment. A norm that satisfies these principles can stably maintain social cooperation. Our insights may offer a general assessment principle that applies to a wide range of subjects, from individual actions to national decisions.

show abstract

Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation

Cited by 28 publications

References 34 publications

Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

Two ways to overcome the three social dilemmas of indirect reciprocity

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About