Punishment and Type of Feedback in a Simulated Commons Dilemma

Harvey, Mark L.; Bell, Paul A.; Birjulin, Andrej A.

doi:10.2466/pr0.1993.73.2.447

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Transparency is largely valued in society, and it can improve a company’s reputation (Deegan, 2012). Nondisclosure on the other hand, has been noted to make no significant impact on decisions (Harvey, Bell, & Birjulin, 1993). The present findings suggest that more targeted focus on expending time and effort on international reporting and monitoring of CO 2 would potentially facilitate sustainable management of this commons.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Money and Time Restrictions Influence Self-Constraining Behavior in Polluting the Commons?

Arbuthnott

Scerbe

2016

Organization & Environment

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Commons are resources shared by a group of people, and are studied using the commons dilemma paradigm. Despite Hardin's prediction that the only sustainable management options are government regulation or private ownership, sustainable commons management has been observed with unregulated groups; however, global commons such as the atmosphere and oceans seem to conform to the prediction of "tragedy" because self-interests among users lead to degradation of the commons through overuse. The present study examined whether the factors of commons type (consumption or waste disposal) and cost (money or time) influence individual self-constraint in harvesting/polluting decisions to prolong the longevity of the shared resource, in the absence of social communication. Results indicate an interaction of the two factors: Individual self-constraint was greatest with the combination of disposal commons and time cost. These findings suggest that creative strategies to manage global commons may be possible, at least for waste-disposal commons.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Money and Time Restrictions Influence Self-Constraining Behavior in Polluting the Commons?

Arbuthnott

Scerbe

2016

Organization & Environment

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“…One way to increase cooperation in social dilemmas is the introduction of a sanctioning system (Caldwell, 1976;Fehr & Gächter, 2002;Harvey, Bell, & Birjulin, 1993;Wit & Wilke, 1990;Yamagishi, 1986Yamagishi, , 1988bYamagishi, , 1992. Such sanctioning systems sanction defection and therefore make it less attractive.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of feedback on support for a sanctioning system in a social dilemma: The difference between installing and maintaining the sanction

Mulder

Dijk

Wilke

et al. 2005

Journal of Economic Psychology

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When do people support sanctioning systems in social dilemmas? Sanctions increase collective efficiency, but have the disadvantage of restricting peopleÕs autonomy. This paper studies the effects of feedback about collective (in)efficiency and the influence of the presence or absence of a sanctioning system. The results show that, except after feedback about collective inefficiency, people were reluctant to support installation of a sanctioning system. When a sanctioning system was already present, however, sanction support was strong and not affected by feedback. Interestingly, the presence of a sanctioning system increased pessimism about attaining collective efficiency. This suggests that the mere presence of a sanctioning system creates the need to have that sanctioning system, and that installing one can have irreversible consequences.

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“…Bonacich, 1986;Loomis et al, 1994;Jager, Jannsen, & Vlek, 2002); cognitive biases ; reinforcers/payout from harvest (e.g., Birjulin, Smith, & Bell, 2001;Martichuski & Bell, 1991;Edney & Bell, 1984;; punishments (Bell, Petersen, & Hautaluoma, 1989;Harvey, Bell, & Birjulin, 1993); power (e.g. Galinsky et al, 1993;Mannix, 1993); structure of the resource (e.g.…”

Section: Factors Associated With Cooperation In Commons Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inheritance, Obligation, and Responsibility in a Commons Dilemma

Porter¹

2007

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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Commons dilemmas occur when individuals harvest from diminishing yet renewable resources like timber or fish populations. Individuals can sustain a resource for a group by harvesting conservatively (cooperation) or they can maximize short-term personal gain at the expense of the group by harvesting heavily (defection). However, if all defect, everyone gets less than if they had cooperated because the resource will deplete faster. The effects of perceived inheritance on harvesting decisions was examined in the context of a commons dilemma simulation.Undergraduates (N = 66) participated in a commons dilemma simulation using points recorded on a chalk board. Each point harvested earned participants an entry into a drawing for $50 in cash and prizes. Before harvesting from the resource, participants estimated the percentage of their peers who would preserve and exploit the resource and indicated how obligated they felt to preserve it. For the experimental manipulation, participants were assigned to the conservative, sustainable, or exploitive conditions who learned that a previous group had grown, kept steady, or diminished the resource, respectively. A control group simply played the commons game. Following the simulation, participants indicated their sense of responsibility for the outcome of the game, and completed an environmental attitudes questionnaire.

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Punishment and Type of Feedback in a Simulated Commons Dilemma

Cited by 7 publications

References 8 publications

How Do Money and Time Restrictions Influence Self-Constraining Behavior in Polluting the Commons?

How Do Money and Time Restrictions Influence Self-Constraining Behavior in Polluting the Commons?

The effect of feedback on support for a sanctioning system in a social dilemma: The difference between installing and maintaining the sanction

Inheritance, Obligation, and Responsibility in a Commons Dilemma

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