Punishment as Moral Fortification and Non-Consensual Neurointerventions

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I defend and expand the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment (FTP). Second, I argue that this theory implies that non-consensual neurointerventions-interventions that act directly on one's brain-are permissible. According to the FTP, punishment is justified as a way of ensuring that citizens who infringe their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their moral powers will thereafter be able to comply with it. I claim that the FTP ought to be expanded to include citizens' interest in developing their moral powers. Thus, states must ensure that their citizens develop their moral reliability, not only because they must enforce their citizens' compliance with certain duties, but also because states have the duty to maintain the conditions for stability and satisfy their citizens' interest in developing their moral powers. According to this account of the FTP, if neurointerventions are the only or best way of ensuring that offenders can discharge their fortificational duties, states have strong reasons to provide these interventions.

Would Nonconsensual Criminal Neurorehabilitation Express a more Degrading Attitude Towards Offenders than Consensual Criminal Neurorehabilitation?

“…If one exploits another person one commits a wrong by wronging the victim, even if the victim has consented to it." 13 Schofield [33] characterizes a perspective as "a point of view from which one perceives, or feels emotions, or has sensations, or judges a proposition to be true, or wills some particular action, and so on" and maintains that one's possession of such perspectives gives rise to moral obligations to oneself.…”