Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Duersch, Peter; Servátka, Maroš

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1011321

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…The direction of this effect was consistent with past findings—sympathy triggered lower defection rates and anger triggered higher defection rates compared to the neutral condition (Batson and Moran, 1999; Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar et al, 2004; Duersch and Servatka, 2007; Van Lange, 2008). Moreover, the strengths of these impacts were found to be more or less symmetrical compared to the neutral condition, despite only the anger condition having significant influences on participant's physiological arousal.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

“…Sympathetic concern also encourages higher donations when a victim (a starving child in Africa) is identifiable (where participants receive a photo and description of the child), than when the victim is presented as a non-identifiable single victim or merely as a statistic (Small et al, 2007). It is also found to encourage more generous decisions toward the other person in economic decision-making games when the outcome of interaction depends on two individuals, such as in the Prisoner's Dilemma (Batson and Moran, 1999; Batson and Ahmad, 2001; Duersch and Servatka, 2007) and “Ring Measure of Social Values” (Van Lange, 2008). In these two games, higher cooperation rates are promoted when participants perceive their opponent to be in need and when they adopt their opponent's feelings (Batson and Moran, 1999; Van Lange, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast, anger is found to encourage higher defection rates in social-exchange games, including the Power-to-Take Game (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar et al, 2004), the Prisoner's Dilemma (Duersch and Servatka, 2007) or the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al, 2003). Using the Power-to-Take Game, Bosman and van Winden (2002) found that the more anger participants felt about their opponent's decision, the more often they destroyed income even if that was costly to the participant themselves.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The effect of partner-directed emotion in social exchange decision-making

Eimontaite¹,

Nicolle²,

Schindler³

et al. 2013

Front. Psychol.

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Despite the prevalence of studies examining economic decision-making as a purely rational phenomenon, common sense suggests that emotions affect our decision-making particularly in a social context. To explore the influence of emotions on economic decision-making, we manipulated opponent-directed emotions prior to engaging participants in two social exchange decision-making games (the Trust Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma). Participants played both games with three different (fictional) partners and their tendency to defect was measured. Prior to playing each game, participants exchanged handwritten “essays” with their partners, and subsequently exchanged evaluations of each essay. The essays and evaluations, read by the participant, were designed to induce either anger, sympathy, or a neutral emotional response toward the confederate with whom they would then play the social exchange games. Galvanic skin conductance level (SCL) showed enhanced physiological arousal during anger induction compared to both the neutral and sympathy conditions. In both social exchange games, participants were most likely to defect against their partner after anger induction and least likely to defect after sympathy induction, with the neutral condition eliciting intermediate defection rates. This pattern was found to be strongest in participants exhibiting low cognitive control (as measured by a Go/no-Go task). The findings indicate that emotions felt toward another individual alter how one chooses to interact with them, and that this influence depends both on the specific emotion induced and the cognitive control of the individual.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The effect of partner-directed emotion in social exchange decision-making

Eimontaite¹,

Nicolle²,

Schindler³

et al. 2013

Front. Psychol.

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“…5 Numerous papers extend these results (for reviews, see Herrmann, 2009, Chaudhuri, 2011), including work focusing on the cost to the punisher (Anderson andPutterman, 2006, Carpenter, 2007), on punishment's effectiveness (that is, the punisher-punished cost ratio, see Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008), and on societal implications of costly punishment. Duersch and Servátka (2009) explore the effect of costly punishment in a prisoner's dilemma set-up, finding punishment to be less prevalent than in the literature on public goods games, but added punishment stages in the PD game otherwise appear absent from the literature.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation Transmission Without Benefit to the Reporter: A Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus

Kamei

Putterman

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Abstract:Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what would motivate an agent to report another's behavior when the pool of potential partners is large and it is easy enough for an aggrieved player to move on. We argue that behavioral or social preference motivations may solve this conundrum. In a laboratory experiment in which subjects lack any private material incentive to report partners' actions, we find that most cooperators incur a cost to report a defecting partner when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner.JEL classification: C91, D03, D63

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“…Fines are then determined by multiplying the amount assigned by the punisher by a punishment enhancement factor, β, usually taken equal to 3. With two exceptions [33,34], there is no literature investigating the effect of stochastic β on the evolution of social norms of punishment and cooperation; the provisional conclusion appears to be that uncertainty does not affect the likelihood of punishing others, nor the level of cooperation [34].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The cost of noise: stochastic punishment falls short of sustaining cooperation in social dilemma experiments

Salahshour,

Oberhauser,

Smerlak

2021

Preprint

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Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation among self-interested agents is a central problem across social and biological sciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have an opportunity to sanction defectors, classical behavioral experiments suggest that cooperation can take root. Overlooked from standard experimental designs, however, is the fact that real-world human punishment-the administration of justice-is intrinsically noisy. Here we show that stochastic punishment falls short of sustaining cooperation in the repeated public good game. As punishment noise increases, we find that contributions decrease and punishment efforts intensify, resulting in a 45% drop in gains compared to a noiseless control. Moreover, we observe that uncertainty causes a rise in antisocial punishment, a mutually harmful behavior previously associated with societies with a weak rule of law. Our approach brings to light challenges to cooperation that cannot be explained by economic rationality and strengthens the case for further investigations of the effect of noise-and not just bias-on human behavior.

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Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Cited by 5 publications

References 35 publications

The effect of partner-directed emotion in social exchange decision-making

The effect of partner-directed emotion in social exchange decision-making

Reputation Transmission Without Benefit to the Reporter: A Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus

The cost of noise: stochastic punishment falls short of sustaining cooperation in social dilemma experiments

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