Push, Pull, and Supply Chain Risk‐Averse Attitude

Yang, Lei; Cai, Gangshu; Chen, Jian

doi:10.1111/poms.12881

Cited by 65 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Pan and So [30] make pricing and production decisions in an assembly system with uncertain supply under a pull contract. Other factors are also considered in the literatures related to pull and push contracts, such as the presence of an outside market [14], the impact of a hybrid push-pull contract [16], a supply chain risk-averse attitude [41], and different lead times for products [42].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination for pull and push contracts in decentralized system with uncertain supply

Zhang

Chu

2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This paper investigates how a random supply can influence management decisions under pull and push contracts in a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. We suppose that the supplier faces yield uncertainty, and we adopt game models to analyse the supply chain members’ decisions (i.e., wholesale price and order quantity) under the two commonly used contracts. Specifically, we analyse the revenue sharing mechanism and buyback mechanism with pull and push contracts, respectively, and find that the buyback contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain with push contract, while the revenue sharing contract cannot improve the performance with a pull contract. Then we design a modified revenue sharing contract that introduces a subsidy for excess inventory and shows that for the pull case, the proposed mechanism can coordinate the supply chain effectively. Finally, the analysis results are displayed intuitively by numerical cases.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination for pull and push contracts in decentralized system with uncertain supply

Zhang

Chu

2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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“…Similarly, the supplier's profit can decrease with more power he has. Yang et al [28] examined the impacts of the firms' risk-averse attitudes and supply chain structure on the supply chain performance. They showed that when the supplier is more risk averse than the retailer, the manufacturer-dominated structure can lead to a higher optimal order quantity than the retailer-dominated structure.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of put option contract and supply chain structure in a multi-period supply chain with uncertain demand

Wan

Fan

2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This paper builds the multi-period optimization models that incorporate put option contract and two supply chain structures to determine the production decision for a supplier and the ordering decision for a manufacturer in a two-stage supply chain. This paper applies the method of dynamic programming to derive the structures of optimal policies and provides an approximate algorithm to evaluate the myopic policies. This paper also conducts numerical examples to illustrate the impacts of put option contract, supply chain structure and demand risk on the members’ decisions and total profits as well as the channel’s total profit. The results indicate that put option contract can motivate to increase the channel’s service level and reduce the manufacturer’s inventory risk under two supply chain structures, when compared to the case without put option contract. In the manufacturer-led structure, the channel always benefits from put option contract, the supplier benefits from put option contract with a high option price and a low exercise price, while the manufacturer benefits from put option contract with a low option price and a high exercise price. In the supplier-led structure, the channel and the manufacturer always benefit from put option contract, while the supplier benefits from put option contract with a high option price and a low exercise price. With put option contract, the supplier is more profitable in the manufacturer-led structure than in the supplier-led structure, while the manufacturer and the channel are more profitable in the supplier-led structure than in the manufacturer-led structure. Without and with put option contract, the optimal total profits of two members and the channel will first decrease and then increase in the demand risk. Finally, this paper identifies the explicit conditions under which the multi-period supply chain can be coordinated via put option contract under two supply chain structures. With a coordinating contract, the supplier and the manufacturer are better off compared to the case without put option contract.

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“…To answer these questions, we develop a Stackelberg game in a two‐echelon supply chain with a pull contract. Conforming to the newsvendor model in a pull contract (see, e.g., Davis et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2018), we assume that the retailer acts as the leader determining the wholesale price and the risk‐averse manufacturer acts as the follower determining the production quantity. We use the semideviation method to gauge the risk of the manufacturer, which is financed by EP or RI.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financing a risk‐averse manufacturer in a pull contract: early payment versus retailer investment

Yang

Fang

Zhang

2020

Int Trans Operational Res

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This work focuses on a two‐level supply chain with a pull contract, where the retailer acts as a leader and the capital‐constrained manufacturer as a follower who undertakes the inventory risk. In the presence of demand uncertainty, the manufacturer is risk‐averse, and the risk is measured by the semideviation method. To finance the capital‐constrained manufacturer, we investigate two collaborative supply chain finance schemes: retailer's early payment (EP) financing and retailer investment (RI) financing. We characterize the manufacturer's optimal production quantity and the retailer's wholesale price under EP and RI. Under the two financing schemes, the manufacturer obtains a higher utility when his risk aversion degree is moderate, while the retailer is worse off in the presence of a higher risk aversion degree. Under RI, both optimal production quantity and wholesale price decrease in the proportion of dividends shared by the manufacturer. For the manufacturer (or the retailer or the total supply chain), we derive the associated parameter region in which RI achieves a higher performance than EP. When RI and EP are available, there exists a common parameter region in which RI is preferred by the manufacturer, retailer, and total supply chain.

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Push, Pull, and Supply Chain Risk‐Averse Attitude

Cited by 65 publications

References 32 publications

Coordination for pull and push contracts in decentralized system with uncertain supply

Coordination for pull and push contracts in decentralized system with uncertain supply

Impacts of put option contract and supply chain structure in a multi-period supply chain with uncertain demand

Financing a risk‐averse manufacturer in a pull contract: early payment versus retailer investment

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