2010
DOI: 10.3386/w15644
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Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice

Abstract: Journal of Economic Literature. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Cited by 220 publications
(333 citation statements)
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References 104 publications
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“…One is work concerned with the role of signals in informing consumer choice within settings where potential consumers find it difficult to judge quality (Daughety and Reinganum, 2008;Dranove and Jin, 2010;Nelson, 1970;Spence, 1973). Our findings add to a growing body of literature which investigates how consumer demand is affected by standardised quality indicators provided by external parties in areas such as schooling (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008), health care (Cutler et al, 2004;Werner et al, 2012) and the environment (Delmas et al, 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…One is work concerned with the role of signals in informing consumer choice within settings where potential consumers find it difficult to judge quality (Daughety and Reinganum, 2008;Dranove and Jin, 2010;Nelson, 1970;Spence, 1973). Our findings add to a growing body of literature which investigates how consumer demand is affected by standardised quality indicators provided by external parties in areas such as schooling (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008), health care (Cutler et al, 2004;Werner et al, 2012) and the environment (Delmas et al, 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…Information asymmetry arrises when one party in a transaction has more information about the characteristics of a product (including its quality). Dranove and Jin (2010) argue that in markets characterized by information asymmetries, a mechanism that ensures quality such as certification, if conducted properly, has the capacity to increase welfare through two mechanisms. First it facilitates matches between sellers and buyers.…”
Section: Halal Certification As a Standardmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At a more general level, our results show that seemingly small changes in disclosure rules may have large impacts. This broad lesson parallels the findings of other studies that examine disclosure as a policy instrument outside the private political domain of industrial standardization (e.g., Fung, Graham, and Weil, 2007;Dranove and Jin, 2010) The balance of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes SSO policies, and presents our model of the disclosure process. Section 3 analyzes disclosure characteristics.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 55%