2015
DOI: 10.1142/s0129183115500734
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Quality effort decision in service supply chain with quality preference based on quantum game

Abstract: Service quality preference behaviors of both members are considered in service supply chain (SSC) including a service integrator and a service provider with stochastic demand. Through analysis of service quality cost and revenue, the utility functions are established on service quality effort degree and service quality preference level in integrated and decentralized SSC. Nash equilibrium and quantum game are used to optimize the models. By comparing the different solutions, the optimal strategies are obtained… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Many factors impact shared manufacturing quality coordination. The literature [12][13][14] conducted a number of studies on quality improvement, but they were all based on traditional expected utility theory. Traditional game analysis, due to its inherent limitations, makes it impossible to ensure the robustness and scientificity of the Figure 6 shows that the subsidy mechanism has a considerable impact on the evolution of the shared manufacturing system, and that the subsidy mechanism may effectively shift the location of the system's equilibrium point.…”
Section: Model Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Many factors impact shared manufacturing quality coordination. The literature [12][13][14] conducted a number of studies on quality improvement, but they were all based on traditional expected utility theory. Traditional game analysis, due to its inherent limitations, makes it impossible to ensure the robustness and scientificity of the Figure 6 shows that the subsidy mechanism has a considerable impact on the evolution of the shared manufacturing system, and that the subsidy mechanism may effectively shift the location of the system's equilibrium point.…”
Section: Model Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yang et al [13] studied the evolutionary stabilization strategies of supply sides and producers using replicated dynamic equations, and the behavioral strategies were closely related to the input-output ratio, quality improvement effort cost, free-rider benefits, and initial strategies. Zhang et al [14] built a service supply chain quality effort decision model with quality preferences and investigated the effect of quality preferences on quality improvement. The preceding studies examined the quality improvement problem from various perspectives, including cost sharing, quality gain, and quality preference, and provided ideas for this paper; however, the research objects of the preceding studies were mostly supply and demand sides, ignoring the influence of regulatory factors.…”
Section: Introduction and Theoretical Assumptions 1introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Zha et al (2015) investigate the effort of a service platform in the hotel service supply chain and explore its influence on the hotel's decision and channel co-ordination. Zhang et al (2015) and Zhang, Xing and Li (2018) have considered the quality preferences of strategic suppliers in the service supply chain that will determine their quality efforts. Komulainen et al (2018) have examined how customer value experience affects the reorganisation of the bank service network.…”
Section: Other Behaviourmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Liu and Wang (2015) established a game model of quality supervision and control of SSC based on hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium in LSSC composed of logistics service integrator (LSI) and functional logistics service provider (FLSP) and discussed the influence of various risk attitude combinations on LSI regulatory probability and FLSP compliance probability. Zhang et al (2015) considered the service quality preference behavior of service integrators and service providers in SSC, established the utility function of service quality effort and service quality preference level in the comprehensive and decentralized SSC, and built a SSC optimization model based on Nash equilibrium and quantum game. We can compare different solutions to find the optimal strategy in the quality preference SSC.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%