Quantum attacks on generalized Feistel networks based on the strong–weak separability

Xu, Ying; Du, Xiaoni; Jia, Meichun; Wang, Xiangyu; Zou, Jian

doi:10.1007/s11128-023-04135-6

Quantum Inf Process

2023

DOI: 10.1007/s11128-023-04135-6

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Quantum attacks on generalized Feistel networks based on the strong–weak separability

Ying Xu,

Xiaoni Du,

Meichun Jia

et al.

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2024

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Cited by 2 publications

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Lightweight block ciphers for resource-constrained environments: A comprehensive survey

Zhong,

2024

Future Generation Computer Systems

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Lightweight block ciphers for resource-constrained environments: A comprehensive survey

Zhong,

2024

Future Generation Computer Systems

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Superposition Attacks on Pseudorandom Schemes Based on Two or Less Permutations

Zhang,

Guo,

Wang

2024

IET Information Security

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We study quantum superposition attacks against permutation‐based pseudorandom cryptographic schemes. We first extend Kuwakado and Morii’s attack against the Even–Mansour cipher and exhibit key recovery attacks against a large class of pseudorandom schemes based on a single call to an n‐bit permutation, with polynomial O(n) (or O(n2), if the concrete cost of Hadamard transform is also taken in) quantum steps. We then consider schemes, namely, two permutation‐based pseudorandom cryptographic schemes. Using the improved Grover‐meet‐Simon method, we show that the keys of a wide class of schemes can be recovered with O(n) superposition queries (the complexity of the original is O(n2n/2)) and O(n2n/2) quantum steps. We also exhibit subclasses of “degenerated” schemes that lack certain internal operations and exhibit more efficient key recovery attacks using either the Simon’s algorithm or collision searching algorithm. Further, using the all‐subkeys‐recovery idea of Isobe and Shibutani, our results give rise to key recovery attacks against several recently proposed permutation‐based PRFs, as well as the two‐round Even–Mansour ciphers with generic key schedule functions and their tweakable variants. From a constructive perspective, our results establish new quantum Q2 security upper bounds for two permutation‐based pseudorandom schemes as well as sound design choices.

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Quantum attacks on generalized Feistel networks based on the strong–weak separability

Cited by 2 publications

References 30 publications

Lightweight block ciphers for resource-constrained environments: A comprehensive survey

Lightweight block ciphers for resource-constrained environments: A comprehensive survey

Superposition Attacks on Pseudorandom Schemes Based on Two or Less Permutations

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