Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion

Broadbent, Anne; Islam, Rabib

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-64381-2_4

Cited by 42 publications

(88 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…In the next step, an adversary in the new game that we described in the last paragraph, is reduced to an adversary against a Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion scheme. In a Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion (QECD) scheme ( [BI20], see also Definition 18), a user can provide proof of deletion for a quantum cipher-text such that the proof can be verified using a separate algorithm. The security guarantee is that if the adversary submits a proof of deletion for a cipher-text that passes verification, then she could not learn the message later, even if she is provided with the secret key.…”

Section: Proof Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The security guarantee is that if the adversary submits a proof of deletion for a cipher-text that passes verification, then she could not learn the message later, even if she is provided with the secret key. We map any adversary against TMAC in the intermediate game described in the last paragraph to an adversary against a QECD scheme in a weaker security game that is a relaxation of the certified deletion game in [BI20] (see Section 5.2). We should point out that this is a scheme specific reduction and we do not know if it can be made generic.…”

Section: Proof Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Definition 18 (Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion, [BI20]). A Quantum encryption with certified deletion scheme or QECD, consists of 5 QPT algorithms key-gen, enc, dec, del, verify fulfilling the following 17 :…”

Section: Reduction To Certified Deletionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The security game described in [BI20] requires that an adversary could not distinguish between the encryption of a message of his choice and that of the 0 λ string, even after being provided with the secret key. These schemes are not certified deletion secure in that sense 18 .…”

Section: Reduction To Certified Deletionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Noise-Tolerant Quantum Tokens for MAC

Behera¹,

Sattath²,

Shinar³

2021

Preprint

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Message Authentication Code or MAC, is a well-studied cryptographic primitive that is used in order to authenticate communication between two parties sharing a secret key. A Tokenized MAC or TMAC is a related cryptographic primitive, introduced by Ben-David & Sattath (QCrypt'17) which allows to delegate limited signing authority to third parties via the use of single-use quantum signing tokens. These tokens can be issued using the secret key, such that each token can be used to sign at most one document.We provide an elementary construction for TMAC based on BB84 states. Our construction can tolerate up to 14% noise, making it the first noise-tolerant TMAC construction. The simplicity of the quantum states required for our construction combined with the noise-tolerance, makes it practically more feasible than the previous TMAC construction.The TMAC is existentially unforgeable against adversaries with signing and verification oracles (i.e., analogous to EUF-CMA security for MAC), assuming post-quantum collision-resistant hash functions exist.

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Section: Proof Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proof Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Reduction To Certified Deletionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Reduction To Certified Deletionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Noise-Tolerant Quantum Tokens for MAC

Behera¹,

Sattath²,

Shinar³

2021

Preprint

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“…Our work and that of [GGV20] assume honest behaviour of the data collector. Unless the data collector has a quantum memory [BI20], this assumption is necessary when modelling compliance to data deletion request. We stress that our notion of deletion-compliance is independent of any notion of privacy, and in particular does not excuse the data collector from respecting the user's privacy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deletion-Compliance in the Absence of Privacy

Godin,

Lamontagne

2022

Preprint

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Garg, Goldwasser and Vasudevan (Eurocrypt 2020) invented the notion of deletion-compliance to formally model the "right to be forgotten", a concept that confers individuals more control over their digital data. A requirement of deletioncompliance is strong privacy for the deletion requesters since no outside observer must be able to tell if deleted data was ever present in the first place. Naturally, many real world systems where information can flow across users are automatically ruled out. The main thesis of this paper is that deletion-compliance is a standalone notion, distinct from privacy. We present an alternative definition that meaningfully captures deletion-compliance without any privacy implications. This allows broader class of data collectors to demonstrate compliance to deletion requests and to be paired with various notions of privacy. Our new definition has several appealing properties:-It is implied by the stronger definition of Garg, Goldwasser, and Vasudevan under natural conditions, and is equivalent when we add a strong privacy requirement. -It is naturally composable with minimal assumptions.-Its requirements are met by data structure implementations that do not reveal the order of operations, a concept known as history-independence. Along the way, we discuss the many challenges that remain in providing a universal definition of compliance to the "right to be forgotten."⋆ This is the full version of [GL21].

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Computationally Secure Semi‐Quantum All‐Or‐Nothing Oblivious Transfer from Dihedral Coset States

Yan,

Wang,

2024

Adv Quantum Tech

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The quest for perfect quantum oblivious transfer (QOT) with information‐theoretic security remains a challenge, necessitating the exploration of computationally secure QOT as a viable alternative. Unlike the unconditionally secure quantum key distribution (QKD), the computationally secure QOT relies on specific quantum‐safe computational hardness assumptions, such as the post‐quantum hardness of learning with errors (LWE) problem and quantum‐hard one‐way functions. This raises an intriguing question: Are there additional efficient quantum hardness assumptions that are suitable for QOT? In this work, leveraging the dihedral coset state derived from the dihedral coset problem (DCP), a basic variant of OT, known as the all‐or‐nothing OT, is studied in the semi‐quantum setting. Specifically, the DCP originates from the dihedral hidden subgroup problem (DHSP), conjectured to be challenging for any quantum polynomial‐time algorithms. First, a computationally secure quantum protocol is presented for all‐or‐nothing OT, which is then simplified into a semi‐quantum OT protocol with minimal quantumness, where the interaction needs merely classical communication. To efficiently instantiate the dihedral coset state, a powerful cryptographic tool called the LWE‐based noisy trapdoor claw‐free functions (NTCFs) is used. The construction requires only a three‐message interaction and ensures perfect statistical privacy for the receiver and computational privacy for the sender.

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Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion

Cited by 42 publications

References 32 publications

Noise-Tolerant Quantum Tokens for MAC

Noise-Tolerant Quantum Tokens for MAC

Deletion-Compliance in the Absence of Privacy

Computationally Secure Semi‐Quantum All‐Or‐Nothing Oblivious Transfer from Dihedral Coset States

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