Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention

Abstract

This paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasi-psychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action. Views in this class hold that collective intentions are realized in or constituted by individual, mental, participatory intentions. I argue that this metaphysical commitment entails persistence conditions that are in tension with a purported obligation to notify co-actors before leaving a collective action attested to by participants in experimental research about the interpersonal normativity of collective action. I then explore the possibilities open to quasi-psychologists for responding to this research.

How green social network affordances enhance pro‐environmental behaviour?

“…For instance, Chiu et al (2019) demonstrated common bond attachments and common identity as organisms that intervene between virtual community cues (stimuli) and virtual community citizenship behaviours (response). Similarly, collective intention reflects a socio‐psychological perspective as it is a combination of individuals' participatory intentions along with their perceptions of others' participatory intentions (Rachar, 2021). In coherence with previous research studies, the current research extends the understanding of the theory by adopting a socio‐psychological perspective on the organism concept.…”

Robot Rights in Joint Action

“…5 Many authors distinguish between ambiguous terms with more than one unrelated meaning and polysemy, which involves several associated or related meanings (cf., Löhr, 2021 for an overview). 6 Authors who have recently discussed such commitments and entitlements are Clark, 2006;Gilbert, 2013;Bratman, 2013;Tuomela, 2013, Roth, 2017Geurts, 2019;Alonso, 2016;Rachar, 2021. I build on these authors here but diverge from them substantially.…”