¿Qué Incentivos al Retiro Genera la Seguridad Social?: El Caso Uruguayo

Álvarez, Ignacio; Silva, Natalia da; Forteza, Alvaro; Rossi, Ianina

doi:10.4067/s0717-68212010000200004

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The basic stylised fact our model has to explain is why Uruguayan employees do not seem eager to retire as soon as they are eligible for public pensions, even when the implicit tax on continued work is comparatively high in Uruguay (Alvarez et al, 2012). The model can in principle explain this behaviour in two ways: either individuals are patient (low discount rate) or comparatively very risk-averse.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…There has not been a similar decline in the retirement age of Uruguayan workers in the last two decades, with some increase in the case of women (Álvarez, da Silva, Forteza, & Rossi, 2010). In turn, in 1995 the parliament passed a law that changed several key parameters in the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pillar and gradually introduced individual accounts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…The law included several measures specifically geared to increasing retirement ages. Different individuals received different treatments, depending on sex, cohort and income level, so there is much diversity in terms of retirement incentives (Alvarez, da Silva, Forteza, & Rossi, 2012). This makes Uruguay an interesting case to analyse the impact of pension rules on retirement in a middle-income country.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A sample of the work history records was made available to the research community and have been used to analyse the impact of social security reforms on individual behaviour and the macroeconomy (Álvarez et al, 2010Bucheli, Forteza, & Rossi, 2010;Forteza et al, 2009). Existing studies are based on the estimation of reduced form models, though, and are not immune to the Lucas critique: the policy response parameters being estimated are not necessarily invariant to policy changes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social Security and Retirement in Uruguay

Forteza

Sanromán

2015

The Journal of Development Studies

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We estimate a structural life-cycle model for retirement behaviour using work history records of the main Uruguayan pension programme. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is around 1.5 and the estimated discount rate is about 1.8 per cent per annum. The marginal disutility of work increases with age and is larger for women than men, and for private than public employees. Simulations show a very low impact of the 1995 pension reform on retirement ages. Many individuals in this population respond little to economic incentives and some individuals would advance rather than postpone retirement after the reform.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social Security and Retirement in Uruguay

Forteza

Sanromán

2015

The Journal of Development Studies

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“…Workers earning the minimum wage have incentives to retire at age 60. However, as labor income increases,the slope is steeper and individuals have more incentives to retire at a later age 4.…”

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confidence: 99%

Male Labor Force Participation and Social Security in Mexico

Aguila

2012

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This product is part of the RAND Labor and Population working paper series. RAND working papers are intended to share researchers' latest findings and to solicit informal peer review. They have been approved for circulation by RAND Labor and Population but have not been formally edited or peer reviewed. Unless otherwise indicated, working papers can be quoted and cited without permission of the author, provided the source is clearly referred to as a working paper. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. is a registered trademark.

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Male labor force participation and social security in Mexico

Aguila¹

2013

Journal of Pension Economics and Finance

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Labor-force participation among Mexican males in their early retirement years (60 to 64 years of age) has decreased in recent decades, from 94.6 percent in 1960 to 65.2 percent in 2010. Similar trends are evident elsewhere in Latin America, and have occurred in the developed world. Such trends pose challenges to financial sustainability of social security systems as working-age populations decrease and those in retirement increase both because of demographic trends and decisions to take early retirement. In this study, we find that the Mexican social security system provides incentives to retire early. The retirement incentives of the Mexican social security system affect retirement behavior, and may be one of the main contributors to early retirement decisions, particularly for lower-income populations. We simulated the effect of the reform from a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) to the new Personal Retirement Accounts (PRA) system and we find that the PRA system also provides incentives to early retirement. Further analysis is needed to assess the financial sustainability of the social security system and financial security in old age for the largest cohorts in Mexico that will begin to retire by 2040.

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¿Qué Incentivos al Retiro Genera la Seguridad Social?: El Caso Uruguayo

Abstract: Unlike many OECD and Latin American countries, in

Cited by 5 publications

References 8 publications

Social Security and Retirement in Uruguay

Social Security and Retirement in Uruguay

Male Labor Force Participation and Social Security in Mexico

Male labor force participation and social security in Mexico

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