Question‐directed Attitudes*

Friedman, Jane

doi:10.1111/phpe.12026

Cited by 118 publications

(87 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…See, e.g., Friedman () and Booth (). For an earlier and related thought: Higginbotham and May (), inspired by Levi (), claim that a subject's suspension of judgment should be represented with a partition of the “possible states of nature”.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Suspend Judging?

Friedman

2015

Nous

Self Cite

171

111

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Suspend Judging?

Friedman

2015

Nous

Self Cite

171

111

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“…Even if in each new situation , the kind of knowledge he acquires is propositional, it is not the case that Columbus, in now knowing how to overcome a crisis at sea, is now in a state of knowledge having a certain content. He is not in such a state, for example, because he lacks the relevant conceptual resources (Farkas , p. 114; Friedman , p. 161). Columbus knows how to overcome a crisis at sea exactly because, when confronted with a dugong, something completely novel to him, he will understand immediately what is to be done.…”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Face-Value Theory, Know-that, Know-wh and Know-how

Felappi

2019

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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For sentences such as (1) Columbus knows that the sea is unpredictable there is a face‐value theory, according to which ‘that’‐clauses are singular terms denoting propositions. Famously, Prior raised an objection to the theory, but defenders of the face‐value theory such as Forbes, King, Künne, Pietroski and Stanley urged that the objection could be met by maintaining that in (1) ‘to know’ designates a complex relation along the lines of being in a state of knowledge having as content. Is the theory safe, then? The aim of this paper is to show that a new problem for the theory arises if we consider some clauses other than ‘that’‐clauses.

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“…But this view is not universally accepted. Jane Friedman (2013) has recently defended an alternative view, according to which suspended judgment is an interrogative attitude. If this alternative view is correct, then states of suspended judgment have questions, rather than propositions, as their contents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In point of fact, this is essentially the principle that I suggest in the following section, except that the unfamiliar notion of nonbelief is replaced with the notion of suspended judgment. 23 This idea is not entirely new Friedman (2013),. whom I mentioned in Sect.…”

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confidence: 98%

A Russellian account of suspended judgment

Atkins

2016

Synthese

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Suspended judgment poses a serious problem for Russellianism. In this paper I examine several possible solutions to this problem and argue that none of them is satisfactory. Then I sketch a new solution. According to this solution, suspended judgment should be understood as a sui generis propositional attitude. By this I mean that it cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, other propositional attitudes, such as belief. Since suspended judgment is sui generis in this sense, sentences that ascribe this attitude to someone should not be analyzed in terms of other attitude ascriptions, such as belief ascriptions. Instead they should be understood as involving a semantically primitive predicate, corresponding to the state of suspended judgment.

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Question‐directed Attitudes*

Cited by 118 publications

References 29 publications

Why Suspend Judging?

Why Suspend Judging?

The Face-Value Theory, Know-that, Know-wh and Know-how

A Russellian account of suspended judgment

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