“…See, for example, Andréka, Madarász, and Németi (2005), Barrett (2017), Barrett and Halvorson (2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b), Coffey (2014), Curiel (2014), Halvorson (2013), Glymour (2013), Hudetz (2015, 2017), Knox (2011, 2014), North (2009), Rosenstock et al. (2015), Rosenstock and Weatherall (2016), Teh and Tsementzis (2017), Tsementzis (2015), Van Fraassen (2014), and Weatherall (2017a).…”
There is sometimes a sense in which one theory posits 'less structure' than another. Philosophers of science have recently appealed to this idea both in the debate about equivalence of theories and in discussions about structural parsimony. But there are a number of different proposals currently on the table for how to compare the 'amount of structure' that different theories posit. The aim of this paper is to compare these proposals against one another and evaluate them on their own merits.
“…See, for example, Andréka, Madarász, and Németi (2005), Barrett (2017), Barrett and Halvorson (2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b), Coffey (2014), Curiel (2014), Halvorson (2013), Glymour (2013), Hudetz (2015, 2017), Knox (2011, 2014), North (2009), Rosenstock et al. (2015), Rosenstock and Weatherall (2016), Teh and Tsementzis (2017), Tsementzis (2015), Van Fraassen (2014), and Weatherall (2017a).…”
There is sometimes a sense in which one theory posits 'less structure' than another. Philosophers of science have recently appealed to this idea both in the debate about equivalence of theories and in discussions about structural parsimony. But there are a number of different proposals currently on the table for how to compare the 'amount of structure' that different theories posit. The aim of this paper is to compare these proposals against one another and evaluate them on their own merits.
“…Obviously, the two theories T and T cannot be definitionally equivalent, since that criterion applies only to single-sorted theories. Therefore, to make sense of the claim that many-sorted logic can be reduced to single-sorted logic, we need a generalization of definitional equivalence (see Barrett & Halvorson, 2015b).…”
Logicians and philosophers of science have proposed various formal criteria for theoretical equivalence. In this paper, we examine two such proposals: definitional equivalence and categorical equivalence. In order to show precisely how these two well-known criteria are related to one another, we investigate an intermediate criterion called Morita equivalence. arXiv:1506.04675v1 [math.LO]
“…In order to do this, let us begin with a brief review of the basic terminology from multi-sorted first order logic. Details can be found in [26,37] and also succinctly in [4].…”
For every compact, connected manifold M, we prove the existence of a sentence φ M in the language of groups such that the homeomorphism group of another compact manifold N satisfies φ M if and only if N is homeomorphic to M. We prove the analogous statement for groups of homeomorphisms preserving an Oxtoby-Ulam probability measure.
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