Quota mobility in the European sugar regime

Abstract

We develop an analytical framework allowing to evaluate the consequences of a market of quota rights in the European Union sugar sector. The three particularities of the sugar regime, i.e., the distinction between "A" and "B" quotas, the levy mechanism and the possibility to produce "c" sugar at world priee, are modelled. The empirical objective is to assess how cross-border quota transferability would influence production in the various regions of the European Union. It appears that roughly 46 % of the production could be reallocated. Some of the sugar production is Iikely to shift from Southem Europe and the Benelux mainly towards France, Germany and Denmark. However, a large amount of transfer would take place between producers of different regiDns in the same country.

Biodiversity versus transgenic sugar beet: the one euro question

“…The model is based on the large open-economy framework of Alston et al (1995), but explicitly recognizes that research protected by intellectual property rights generates monopoly profits (Moschini and Lapan, 1997). It is framed to the policy and market features of the EU Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar (Bureau et al, 1997, Combette et al, 1997 sugar beet into the model, the technology-specific parameters engender a pivotal shift of the regional NLCE supply functions and hence of the export supply and demand functions. The world price is modelled as the intersection of both functions on the world market.…”

Static and Dynamic Distributional Effects of Decoupled Payments: Single Farm Payments in the European Union

“…However, the allocation of entitlements is 3 There is a large related literature on the effects of tradability of production quota (Alston, 1981;Burrell, 1989;Babcock and Foster, 1992;Guyomard, et al, 1996;Sumner and Wolf. 1996;Boots, Oude Lansink, and Peerlings, 1997;Bureau et al, 1997;Bureau, Guyomard, and Requillart, 2001). …”

A multi-agent simulation model for spatial optimisation of manure allocation

“…Despite the reality of strong rigidities and transaction costs in quota markets, their modelling is often based on a perfect market for quota rights (Alvarez et al, 2006;Brannlund et al, 1998;Bureau et al, 1997;Fraser et al, 1997;Mahler, 1994;Van Passel et al, 2006). ) with E mft being the amount of exported manure of manure type m from the farm to transport firm t, I mft the amount of incoming manure of manure type m at the farm from transport firm t and T mt1t2 the amount of manure of manure type m transported from transport firm t 1 to transport firm t 2 .…”