2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.07.007
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R&D-induced industry polarization and shake-outs

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Cited by 19 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Finally, notice that the asymmetric equilibria only occurs at the turning point at which the firms switch from collaborating in R&D to no collaboration at all. Such asymmetric equilibria in oligopoly R&D games, although in different contexts, are already captured by some studies (see Tesoriere, 2009;Amir et al, 2010Amir et al, , 2011. In the open economy setting, we find that the asymmetric equilibria may arise where the governments, as first mover players, play asymmetric trade policies.…”
Section: The Analysissupporting
confidence: 59%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Finally, notice that the asymmetric equilibria only occurs at the turning point at which the firms switch from collaborating in R&D to no collaboration at all. Such asymmetric equilibria in oligopoly R&D games, although in different contexts, are already captured by some studies (see Tesoriere, 2009;Amir et al, 2010Amir et al, , 2011. In the open economy setting, we find that the asymmetric equilibria may arise where the governments, as first mover players, play asymmetric trade policies.…”
Section: The Analysissupporting
confidence: 59%
“…Such asymmetric equilibria in oligopoly R&D games, although in different contexts, are already captured by some studies (see Tesoriere, ; Amir et al, , ). In the open economy setting, we find that the asymmetric equilibria may arise where the governments, as first mover players, play asymmetric trade policies.…”
Section: The Analysismentioning
confidence: 76%
“…1 Yet, despite this ubiquitous and long-standing reliance on linear demand, the present paper will argue that some important foundational and robustness aspects of this special demand function remain less than fully understood. 2 Often limiting consideration to the two-good case, the early literature on linear demand offered a number of clear-cut conclusions both on the structure of linear demand systems as well as on its potential to deliver unambiguous conclusions for some fundamental questions in oligopoly theory. Among the former, one can mention the duality features uncovered in the well known paper by Singh and Vives (1984), namely (i) the dual linear structure of inverse and direct demands (along with the use of roman and greek parameters), (ii) the duality between substitute and complementary products and the invariance of the associated cross-slope 1 Martin (2002) provides an insightful overview of the history of the linear demand system, as well as a comparison between the Bowley and the Shubik specifications.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…6 First, notice that, by the e¢ ciency of pro…le x c , we already know 6 We recall that in Amir's et al (2000) paper, the following ranking is established for simultaneous and sequential payo¤s in the symmetric case:…”
Section: Sequential Randd Investment Gamementioning
confidence: 99%