We present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among …rms in which also the timing of R&D investments is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature, the endogenous formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. This allows to consider the formation of R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are su¢ ciently low, …rms may …nd di¢ cult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, the stability of an R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When instead spillovers are su¢ ciently high, cooperation in R&D constitutes a pro…table option, although …rms also possess an incentive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely pro…table, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless …rms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.