RACE: Risk analysis for cooperative engines

Boudguiga, Aymen; Boulanger, Antoine; Chiron, Pascal; Klaudel, Witold; Labiod, Houda; Seguy, Jean-Christophe

doi:10.1109/ntms.2015.7266516

Cited by 19 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…However, EVITA mainly focuses on security risk assessment and does not use a systematic approach for the identification of threat scenarios, so it may be more exhausting when identifying threat scenarios for ICVs. The risk analysis method for cooperative engines (RACE) [ 41 ] is an improved approach for EVITA. RACE defines the severity value as the highest of the four values of the severity vector.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complying with ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434: A Safety and Security Co-Analysis Method for Intelligent Connected Vehicle

Li,

Liu,

Liu

et al. 2024

Sensors

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A cyber-physical system (CPS) integrates communication and automation technologies into the operational processes of physical systems. Nowadays, as a complex CPS, an intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) may be exposed to accidental functional failures and malicious attacks. Therefore, ensuring the ICV’s safety and security is crucial. Traditional safety/security analysis methods, such as failure mode and effect analysis and attack tree analysis, cannot provide a comprehensive analysis for the interactions between the system components of the ICV. In this work, we merge system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) with the concept phase of ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434. We focus on the interactions between components while analyzing the safety and security of ICVs to reduce redundant efforts and inconsistencies in determining safety and security requirements. To conquer STPA’s abstraction in describing causal scenarios, we improved the physical component diagram of STPA-SafeSec by adding interface elements. In addition, we proposed the loss scenario tree to describe specific scenarios that lead to unsafe/unsecure control actions. After hazard/threat analysis, a unified risk assessment process is proposed to ensure consistency in assessment criteria and to streamline the process. A case study is implemented on the autonomous emergency braking system to demonstrate the validation of the proposed method.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complying with ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434: A Safety and Security Co-Analysis Method for Intelligent Connected Vehicle

Li,

Liu,

Liu

et al. 2024

Sensors

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show abstract

“…It indicates that Dominic et al [10], and Parkinson et al [22] cover the security risk estimation and management in AVs; however, they provide little details on AV system assessment's impact. Other related studies [6][7][8][9]15,18] address security risk management, some [4,7] focus on safety and security engineering in AVs. But these studies do not discuss estimations needed for AV stakeholder security investment decisions.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But these studies do not discuss estimations needed for AV stakeholder security investment decisions. In [4], Boudguiga et al TVRA and EVITA methods are combined, but they did not include the cost of countermeasures to assess the severity of the security risks in supporting business decisions. Our study provides a securityfocused risk estimation and management analysis on the AV information system, covering the security assets, threats, resulting risks, proposed countermeasures and risk impact estimations based on the mentioned security metrics.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Risk Estimation and Management in Autonomous Driving Vehicles

Affia

Matulevičius

Tõnisson

2021

Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing

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Autonomous vehicles (AV) are intelligent information systems that perceive, collect, generate and disseminate information to improve knowledge to act autonomously and provide its required services of mobility, safety, and comfort to humans. This paper combines the security risk management (ISSRM) and operationally critical threat, asset, and vulnerability evaluation (OCTAVE allegro) methods to define and assess the AV protected assets, security risks, and countermeasures.

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“…One effective method to describe attack surfaces are attack trees, which were first introduced in Reference [15] to manage the large number of threats derived from comprehensive threat modelling in general security. Attack tress have since been employed in automotive security in a number of scenarios [70][71][72]. To create attack trees potential threat agents and their goals in compromising the system first need to be identified.…”

Section: Synthesis Of Attack Surfacementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Risk analysis has been becoming compulsory to understand and control the potential system breaches and vulnerabilities [71]. Moreover, this analysis can also be used to rank the threats to help defenders deploy security resource most effectively for a mitigation plan.…”

Section: Understanding Dynamic Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Reference Architecture for Attack Surface Analysis

Maple

Bradbury

et al. 2019

Applied Sciences

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Connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) will be deployed over the next decade with autonomous functionalities supported by new sensing and communication capabilities. Such functionality exposes CAVs to new attacks that current vehicles will not face. To ensure the safety and security of CAVs, it is important to be able to identify the ways in which the system could be attacked and to build defences against these attacks. One possible approach is to use reference architectures to perform an attack surface analysis. Existing research has developed a variety of reference architectures but none for the specific purpose of attack surface analysis. Existing approaches are either too simple for sufficiently detailed modelling or require too many details to be specified to easily analyse a CAV’s attack surface. Therefore, we propose a reference architecture using a hybrid Functional-Communication viewpoint for attack surface analysis of CAVs, including the Devices, Edge and Cloud systems CAVs interact with. Using two case studies, we demonstrate how attack trees can be used to understand the attack surface of CAV systems.

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RACE: Risk analysis for cooperative engines

Cited by 19 publications

References 2 publications

Complying with ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434: A Safety and Security Co-Analysis Method for Intelligent Connected Vehicle

Complying with ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434: A Safety and Security Co-Analysis Method for Intelligent Connected Vehicle

Security Risk Estimation and Management in Autonomous Driving Vehicles

A Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Reference Architecture for Attack Surface Analysis

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