Radical Interpretation and Moore's Paradox

Abstract

Moore's sentences of the form “P & ∼I believe that P” and “P & I believe that ∼P” are thought to be paradoxical because they cannot be properly asserted despite being possibly true. Solutions to the paradox usually explain the oddity of such sentences in terms of phenomena as diverse as the pragmatics of speech acts, nature of belief or justification. In this paper I shall argue that despite their seemingly different approaches to the problem, there is a single strategy that underlies all such proposals. Having criticized these suggestions, I shall defend my own solution according to which Moorean sentences are defective not because of some associated logical impropriety but because their assertion violates a certain interpretive constraint, viz., the principle of charity, on an adequate theory of meaning.

Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief

“…In a recent paper in this journal, Hamid Vahid (2008) argues against three families of explanation of Moore‐paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach that Moore‐paradoxical utterances are “assertorically defective” (Vahid, 2008, pp. 147, 148); I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p .…”

“…So making a Moore‐paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions (in the omissive case about my belief that p , and in the commissive case about whether p ). The second is the epistemic approach that Moore‐paradoxical beliefs are “epistemically defective” (Vahid, 2008, p. 153); one that is committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p . So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore‐paradoxical belief.…”

“…I propounded this approach in Williams (2004). 4 The third is the conscious belief approach , that conscious Moore‐paradoxical belief is “doxastically defective” (Vahid, 2008, p. 149). This approach is committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p .…”

“…Firstly, whatever is wrong with Moore‐paradoxical belief is wrong epistemically, because the pathology of belief is an epistemological phenomenon. Secondly, conscious belief, not belief per se, is what occupies Vahid's discussion (2008, section 1.2). Thirdly, Vahid includes in this family of explanations the self‐falsification approach: that it is impossible to hold an omissive true Moore‐paradoxical belief – but this will not generalize to the commissive case, nor is it about conscious Moore‐paradoxical belief.…”

“…The second is that each approach identifies something contradiction‐like, but without identifying it with the content of the Moore‐paradoxical assertion or belief 6 . Having objected to these sorts of explanation, Vahid argues for a Davidson‐inspired defective‐interpretation approach – that Moore‐paradoxical utterances are “interpretively defective” (2008, p. 157). Broadly speaking, this is the claim that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore‐paradoxical sentence as a speaker.…”