Radicalization Trajectories: An Evidence-Based Computational Approach to Dynamic Risk Assessment of “Homegrown” <i>Jihadists</i>

Klausen, Jytte; Libretti, Rosanne; Hung, Benjamin W. K.; Jayasumana, Anura P.

doi:10.1080/1057610x.2018.1492819

Cited by 30 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…While the common sense is that marriage reduces the risk of violence, it is shown in the literature that it can contribute to the process of radicalization through several mechanisms, including marriage to an extremist individual or marriage into the community of extremists which ‘is highly recommended by [radical] preachers and recruiters, and is one of the ways that the cult of jihadism separates new followers from family and community’ (Klausen et al : 18). In our analyses, we controlled for respondents’ marital status to see whether there is any difference in radicalization of married and unmarried individuals.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is a considerable number of European Muslim youth travelling to Syria to join Muslim Jihadist fighters; these young Muslims are coming from all countries throughout Europe, including the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, France, and Switzerland (Foner ; NCTV 2013; Van Bergen, Feddes, Doosje and Pels ). In addition to the problem of ‘foreign fighters’, there has been a growing concern about homegrown jihadists who primarily commit terrorist attacks in European countries (Klausen, Libretti, Hung and Jayasumana ; Levin ; Schuurman, Eijkman and Bakker ; Wilner and Dubouloz ). In fact, a recent report shows that ‘ Jihadist attacks are committed primarily by homegrown terrorists, radicalized in their country of residence without having travelled to join a terrorist group abroad’ (EUALEC : 5).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perception of Western governments’ hostility to Islam among European Muslims before and after ISIS: the important roles of residential segregation and education

Hekmatpour

Burns

2019

British Journal of Sociology

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Perception of Western governments’ hostility to Islam is one of the indicating features of Islamic fundamentalism and, in some cases, is serving as a pull to join extremist groups. In this paper, using data from two waves of a cross‐national survey, we investigate what affects European Muslims’ opinions about Western governments. We find that residential segregation is associated with perceived hostility of Western governments to Islam. Further, we find that Muslims living in segregated neighbourhoods and enclaves have a higher probability of believing that Western governments are hostile to Islam. National origins of Muslim immigrants have a significant impact, with people from African countries measuring less perceived hostility than others. We also find that education is associated with perceived hostility of Western governments to Islam in a non‐linear way. People with the highest and lowest levels of education tend to be less likely to believe that Western governments are hostile to Islam, relative to people with mid‐level education. This non‐linear effect is best explained by education’s differential effects on perceptions of key world events. During the time between 2011 – before ISIS’s announcement of its Caliphate in Iraq and Syria – and 2013, subsequent to that announcement, we see a sharp decrease in perception of Western governments’ hostility to Islam, particularly among more educated European Muslims. We make the case that this decrease can be attributed, in some ways, to the emergence of ISIS. We discuss our findings in terms of theoretical and policy implications.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perception of Western governments’ hostility to Islam among European Muslims before and after ISIS: the important roles of residential segregation and education

Hekmatpour

Burns

2019

British Journal of Sociology

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“…| 9 of 90 also impact the different outcomes at any given point in time (Klausen et al, , 2020) (Figure 4). This logic model serves not only to help contextualize the role of risk and protective factors in increasing or decreasing the likelihood of differential radicalization outcomes, or movements between them.…”

Section: How Risk and Protective Factors Might Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

Cognitive and behavioral radicalization: A systematic review of the putative risk and protective factors

Wolfowicz

Litmanovitz

Weisburd

et al. 2021

Campbell Systematic Reviews

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Background Two of the most central questions in radicalization research are, (1) why do some individuals radicalize when most of those from the same groups or exposed to similar conditions do not? and (2) why do radicalized individuals turn to radical violence while the majority remain inert? It has been suggested that the answer to both questions lie in the cumulative and interactive effects of a range of risk factors. While risk assessment and counter‐radicalization take a risk‐protective factor approach, there is widespread debate as to what these factors are and which are most important. Objectives This review has two primary objectives. 1) To identify what the putative risk and protective factors for different radicalization outcomes are, without any predeterminations. 2) To synthesize the evidence and identify the relative magnitude of the effects of different factors. The review's secondary objectives are to: 1) Identify consistencies in the estimates of factors across different radicalization outcomes. 2) Identify whether any significant heterogeneity exists within factors between (a) geographic regions, and (b) strains of radicalizing ideologies. Search Methods Over 20 databases were searched for both published and gray literature. In order to provide a more comprehensive review, supplementary searches were conducted in two German and one Dutch database. Reference harvesting was conducted from previous reviews and contact was made with leading researchers to identify and acquire missing or unpublished studies. Selection Criteria The review included observational studies assessing the outcomes of radical attitudes, intentions, and/or radical behaviors in OECD countries and which provided sufficient data to calculate effect sizes for individual‐level risk and protective factors. Data Collection and Analysis One‐hundred and twenty‐seven studies, containing 206 samples met the inclusion criteria and provided 1302 effect sizes pertaining to over 100 different factors. Random effects meta‐analyses were carried out for each factor, and meta‐regression and moderator analysis were used to explore differences across studies. Results Studies were primarily cross‐sectional, with samples representing 20 countries OECD countries. Most studies examined no specific radicalizing ideology, while others focussed on specific ideologies (e.g., Islamist, right‐wing, and left‐wing ideologies). The studies generally demonstrated low risk of bias and utilized validated or widely acceptable measures for both indicators and outcomes. With some exceptions, sociodemographic factors tend to have the smallest estimates, with larger estimates for experiential and attitudinal factors, followed by traditional criminogenic and psychological factors. Authors' Conclusions While sociodemographic factors are the most commonly examined factors (selective availability), they also tend to have the smallest estimates. So too, attitudinal and even experiential factors, do not have effect sizes of the magnitude that could lead to significa...

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“…More nuanced classifications, expanding these classes to eight states, have also been proposed [25], while the IVEE theory focuses on three main steps: individual vulnerability (IV), exposure (E), emergence (E) [26,27]. The time-scale for individuals to advance through these hierarchies varies, but case studies conducted on sixty-eight American homegrown Al-Qaeda inspired radicals reveal that pre-radicalization takes four to five years, while progression through the following stages is faster and occurs over a timeframe of less than three years [28,29,30,31]. Other studies conducted on ten religious radical groups by New York Police Department detectives, analysts and intelligence officials show that the time spent in the at risk or in the susceptible class is approximately one and a half and three years, respectively; the time in the more radical stages is about two years each [20].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mathematical Models of Radicalization and Terrorism

Chuang,

D'Orsogna

2019

Preprint

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The rapid spread of radical ideologies has led to a world-wide succession of terrorist attacks in recent years. Understanding how extremist tendencies germinate, develop, and drive individuals to action is important from a cultural standpoint, but also to help formulate response and prevention strategies. Demographic studies, interviews with radicalized subjects, analysis of terrorist databases, reveal that the path to radicalization occurs along progressive steps, where age, social context and peer-to-peer exchanges play major roles. To execute terrorist attacks, radicals must efficiently communicate with one another while maintaining secrecy; they are also subject to pressure from counter-terrorism agencies, public opinion and the need for material resources. Similarly, government entities must gauge which intervention methods are most effective. While a complete understanding of the processes that lead to extremism and violence, and of which deterrents are optimal, is still lacking, mathematical modelers have contributed to the discourse by using tools from statistical mechanics and applied mathematics to describe existing and novel paradigms, and to propose novel counter-terrorism strategies. We review some of their approaches in this work, including compartment models for populations of increasingly extreme views, continuous time models for age-structured radical populations, radicalization as social contagion processes on lattices and social networks, agent based models, game theoretic formulations. We highlight the useful insights offered by analyzing radicalization and terrorism through quantitative frameworks. Finally, we discuss the role of institutional intervention and the stages at which deradicalization strategies might be most effective.

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Radicalization Trajectories: An Evidence-Based Computational Approach to Dynamic Risk Assessment of “Homegrown” Jihadists

Cited by 30 publications

References 7 publications

Perception of Western governments’ hostility to Islam among European Muslims before and after ISIS: the important roles of residential segregation and education

Perception of Western governments’ hostility to Islam among European Muslims before and after ISIS: the important roles of residential segregation and education

Cognitive and behavioral radicalization: A systematic review of the putative risk and protective factors

Mathematical Models of Radicalization and Terrorism

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