2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.jenvrad.2013.10.027
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Radioxenon detections in the CTBT international monitoring system likely related to the announced nuclear test in North Korea on February 12, 2013

Abstract: Observations made in April 2013 of the radioxenon isotopes (133)Xe and (131m)Xe at measurement stations in Japan and Russia, belonging to the International Monitoring System for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, are unique with respect to the measurement history of these stations. Comparison of measured data with calculated isotopic ratios as well as analysis using atmospheric transport modeling indicate that it is likely that the xenon measured was created in the underground nuclear t… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
4
1

Citation Types

2
60
0

Year Published

2015
2015
2020
2020

Publication Types

Select...
7
2

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 116 publications
(62 citation statements)
references
References 16 publications
2
60
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The only atmospheric indication of the underground nuclear test performed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2013 was the detection of 131m Xe and 133 Xe (Ringbom et al, 2014). Taken individually, the detected concentrations of these two isotopes were within the typical range detected by current IMS samplers.…”
Section: Dprk 2013 Nuclear Testmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…The only atmospheric indication of the underground nuclear test performed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2013 was the detection of 131m Xe and 133 Xe (Ringbom et al, 2014). Taken individually, the detected concentrations of these two isotopes were within the typical range detected by current IMS samplers.…”
Section: Dprk 2013 Nuclear Testmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…In addition, as nonreactive noble gas, these radioxenons are more difficult to contain from underground nuclear explosions than particles and therefore more likely to escape to the atmosphere (e.g., Carrigan et al, ; Perkins & Casey, ). Monitoring radioxenon worldwide is therefore a key, discriminating step in the framework of the CTBT (Kalinowski et al, ) and has already been used to provide evidence of North Korea's nuclear tests (e.g., Ringbom et al, ). It can be noted that the IMS network has also detected radionuclide (aerosols and radioxenons) from the Fukushima accident (e.g., Achim et al, ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A striking case illustrating the high capability of the IMS noble gas network to detect delayed signals from a nuclear explosion is given by the radioxenon isotopic ratios 131m Xe/ 133 Xe measured in April 2013 at the Takasaki IMS station (Japan). These signals based on atmospheric transport conditions prevailing at that time and on the study of the station detection records, were considered to be possibly linked to releases of radioactive xenon 7-8 weeks following the nuclear test conducted on February 12, 2013 by North Korea (Ringbom et al, 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%