Raimond Gaita's example of saintly love, in which the visit of a nun to psychiatric patients has profound effects on him, has been criticised for being an odd and unconvincing example of saintliness. I defend Gaita against four specific criticisms; firstly, that the nun achieves nothing spectacular, but merely adopts a certain attitude towards people; secondly, that Gaita must already have certain beliefs for the example to work; thirdly, that to be acclaimed a saint requires a saintly biography, not just an incidence of good behaviour; and finally, that there is something oppressive about saintly behaviour. I consider that Gaita does indeed leave himself open to criticism on this last point by claiming that saints love impartially. I argue that his description of the example suggests rather that the customs and practices of partial love are at the heart of saintliness and not some form of 'life-denying' impartiality. If I am right, then this has the twofold effect of making saintliness appear achievable by ordinary mortals and explaining our feelings of wonder in the face of such saintly behaviour.In his famous paper, "Saints and Heroes", Urmson (1958) encouraged philosophers to make room for supererogatory behaviour in moral theory. Supererogatory acts are those which are beyond what is required by the obligations of the normal moral code and are regarded as optional, often comprising saintly and heroic acts where much good is done but at a high price for the moral agent. 1 Much has been written since Urmson's paper concerning supererogation. The most recent major topic in this area has been the problem of 'overdemandingness' in morality, which asks: why aren't we all obliged to be saints and do Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2012) 15:191-202