2021
DOI: 10.1109/tc.2020.2995838
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Random CFI (RCFI): Efficient Fine-Grained Control-Flow Integrity Through Random Verification

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Cited by 6 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…For defense against architectural and system design flaws various protection techniques such as usage of trusted execution environments for local [53], remote [54] and IoT systems [55], cache side-channel mitigation techniques such as runtime detection [56] and concurrent randomization of processor frequency and prefetcher operation [57], memory protection techniques such as Combined Tag and Data Parity (CTDP) schemes [58] and control flow integrity verification techniques such as selective and random verification [59] can be used.…”
Section: B) Architectural and System Threat Countermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For defense against architectural and system design flaws various protection techniques such as usage of trusted execution environments for local [53], remote [54] and IoT systems [55], cache side-channel mitigation techniques such as runtime detection [56] and concurrent randomization of processor frequency and prefetcher operation [57], memory protection techniques such as Combined Tag and Data Parity (CTDP) schemes [58] and control flow integrity verification techniques such as selective and random verification [59] can be used.…”
Section: B) Architectural and System Threat Countermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] have demonstrated the ability to defeat various types of control-flow hijacking, because the control-flows in the attacks are not specified in the CFG, even while considering the powerful attacker model in which an attacker can read all memory and manipulate all writable memory. Hence, since its inception [1], CFI techniques have been steadily studied as a principle solution against controlflow hijacking, such as return-oriented programming (ROP) [17] and its variants [18] [19] [20].…”
Section: ] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Random CFI (RCFI) [13] works on the top of a base CFI scheme to boost performance of the base scheme without significant security loss. It means the following two things: (1) RCFI can make more synergy with performance-efficient base schemes than not, and (2) RCFI cannot solve the other limitations of the base scheme such as memory overhead.…”
Section: Limitations Of Optimization Strategies In Existing Schemesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In response to the challenges arising from software-based CFI, researchers have introduced hardware-based CFI techniques [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46] In terms of hardware, security experts design hardware circuits for processors or integrate additional storage capacity and instruction set extensions to implement CFI. Hardware-based CFI significantly reduces processor execution overhead.…”
Section: B the Current State Of Defense Against Code Reuse Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%