Random wastes, imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standards

Beavis, Brian; Walker, Martin

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(83)90004-x

Cited by 45 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…1 Despite the perceived advantages of market-based environmental policies over traditional command-and-control approaches, a number of authors have made it clear that the efficiency gains realized by emissions trading programs will depend on rates of compliance, which in turn will depend on the enforcement processes and activities pursued by those running the programs (Keeler, 1991;Malik, 1990Malik, , 1992van Egteren &: Weber, 1996). Others have provided conceptual analyses of how enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs should be designed to achieve high rates of compliance in a cost-effective manner (Beavis&: Walker, 1983;Stranlund &: Dhanda, 1999;Stranlund &: Chavez, 2000). Almost no effort has been devoted to describing the enforcement practices and compliance performance of actual emissions trading programs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs

Stranlund

Chávez

Field

2002

Policy Studies Journal

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs

Stranlund

Chávez

Field

2002

Policy Studies Journal

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“…The first paper in this literature appears to be Beavis and Walker [1]. They considered noncompliant behavior when emissions are random (emissions in our model are deterministic) and they characterized a uniform monitoring program to achieve an aggregate emissions target in a cost-effective manner.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System

Stranlund¹,

Dhanda

1999

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

100

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The literature on noncompliant firms in transferable emissions permit systems offers little guidance to policymakers that must determine how to commit resources to monitor firms and punish violations in such systems. We consider how a budget-constrained enforcement autl1ority that seeks to minimize aggregate noncompliance in a transferable emissions permit system should allocate its monitoring and enforcement efforts among heterogeneous firms. With a conventional model of firm behavior in a transferable permit system, we find that differences in the allocation of monitoring and enforcement effort between any two types of firms should be independent of differences in their exogenous characteristics.

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“…Consequently, the command-andcontrol 'enforcement deficit' -similar to the unpredictable quantity effects of charges that has been discussed in the sense of an 'uncovered ecological flank' -appears to be indicative of the fact that the eventually resulting amount of emission can only be a parameter of expectation of governmental intervention. 6 On the analysis of models of emissions trading showing enforcement deficits, see Beavis and Walker (1983), Malik (1990), Stranlund (1999), andZhang (1999); for economic enforcement models of environmental charges see e.g. Lee (1984) and Martin (1984).…”

Section: Instrumental Aspects Of the Enforcement Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcement of environmental charges: some economic aspects and evidence from the German Waste Water Charge

Gawel

2001

Eur. Env.

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Enforcement problems are usually analysed with respect to command‐and‐control measures of environmental regulation. The recognition that any environmental policy instrument entails an enforcement problem in principle is basic to a comparative analysis of enforcement effects. This paper deals with the comparative enforcement effects of charges: How does enforcement of a charge function? Which problems occur particularly in the enforcement of charges? Could enforcement be facilitated by a specific construction of charge laws? Are economic concepts of charge enforceable at all, and if so, under what conditions? Are charges more readily enforceable than other instruments? Therefore, some economic theory assessments of enforcement processes are presented first. In a third part, the paper sheds light on the practical experience made with the enforcement of the German Waste Water Charge. It is argued that the well worn thesis of an enforcement‐friendly ‘self‐control’ of market instruments is based on unrealistic assumptions. Whether against this background enforcement of environmental policy can be facilitated by an increased application use of charges must be viewed sceptically in an overall assessment of the problematic. Moreover, the transition from allocative control tasks to fiscal environmental charges may well be a symptom of rather than a contribution to the solution of the political and administrative crisis of enforcement. Especially for charges, the crucial question seems to be the political implementation rather than concrete enforcement by local authorities. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment

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Random wastes, imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standards

Cited by 45 publications

References 7 publications

Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs

Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs

Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System

Enforcement of environmental charges: some economic aspects and evidence from the German Waste Water Charge

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