Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach

Bossert, Walter; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Xu, Yongsheng

doi:10.1006/jeth.1994.1045

Cited by 139 publications

(107 citation statements)

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“…W tym pierwszym uję-ciu, z preferencjami, zdefi niować można kryterium pośredniej uży-teczności (indirect utility criterion) [Bossert, Pattanaik, Xu 1994]. Zgodnie z nim, zbiór K oferuje więcej swobody niż zbiór L, gdy maksymalna użyteczność osiągana na zbiorze K jest większa od maksymalnej użyteczności osiąganej na zbiorze L, tzn.…”

Section: Swoboda Wyboruunclassified

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2014

Prakseologia

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2014

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“…The next axiom is also fairly uncontroversial and is utilized by virtually every researcher in the field, for example, see Arrow (1995); Bossert et al (1994);Gravel (1994); Klemisch-Ahlert (1993); Nehring and Puppe (1996); Puppe (1996); Sen (1991); Suppes (1987). Actually, its origin could be traced to the literature on flexibility under uncertainty about future tastes introduced by Koopmans (1964), see also Kreps (1979).…”

Section: Axiom T (Transitivity)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently a growing number of researchers have suggested a great variety of axioms trying to capture different intuitions of the intrinsic value of freedom, see Bossert et al (1994); Gravel (1994); Jones and Sugden (1982); Klemisch-Ahlert (1993) Xu (1990, 1996); Puppe (1996); Sen (1985Sen ( , 1991Sen ( , 1993; Sugden (1996) and Suppes (1987) among others. Some authors have proposed a set of axioms which are completely independent of an underlying preference relation among basic alternatives, see Klemisch-Ahlert (1993); Pattanaik and Xu (1990); Suppes (1987) among others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the axiomatic approach to freedom as opportunity: a general characterization result

Gekker¹

2001

Mathematical Social Sciences

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“…The issue of de®ning and measuring individual freedom of choice has received attention recently (see, inter alia, Arrow [3], Bossert et al [17], Gravel ([38], [39]) Jones and Sugden [49], Klemisch-Ahlert [52], Pattanaik and Xu [54], Puppe ([55], [56]), Sen ([71], [72], [73]) and Suppes [74]). Typically, this question is handled by studying the consequences of imposing`plausible' properties, or axioms, on the binary relation induced by the statement`o¨ers at least as much freedom as' applied to alternative individual opportunity sets.…”

Section: Normative Consistency and Aggregation Of Rankings Of Opportumentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

Gravel

Laslier

Trannoy

2000

Social Choice and Welfare

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Abstract. The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals`tastes' ± which re¯ect the self-interested view point of the individuals ± into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called`ethics of responsibility' and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of`laundering' individual preferences is also provided.The principle of right, and so of justice, puts limit on which satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one's * We thank Nick Baigent, John Broome, David Donaldson, Marc Fleurbaey, Emmanuel Picavet and an anonymous referee for very helpful discussions and/or comments. The usual disclaimer applies fully. Earlier versions of this paper have circulated under various titles including, notably, Self-Laundering of Preferences and Universalization and A Theory of Individual Moral Consistency.good. In drawing up plans and in deciding on aspirations, men are to take these constraints into account.

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Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach

Cited by 139 publications

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On the axiomatic approach to freedom as opportunity: a general characterization result

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

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