Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test

Abstract

Although mediation between disputing states seems to have become a prevalent method of conflict resolution, especially in the post-Cold War era, the fact remains that in only 35% of all militarized disputes since World War II did some form of third-party mediation take place. This suggests that some conflict situations are more open to mediation than others. This study develops and tests a rational model of the conditions under which mediation will occur in international conflicts. The model explores the mediator’s intervention dilemma in terms of her perceived ability to transform the game that characterizes the present conflict into a game of (partial or complete) cooperation. The measure of conflict versatility is offered to denote the likelihood of, and difficulty involved in, such transformation. It is argued that the greater the versatility of the conflict, (1) the more likely are disputants to seek mediation, (2) the more likely are outside parties to mediate, and (3) the more intrusive the mediation strategies employed. Examining data on Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) since World War II, the authors find substantive support for these hypotheses. The article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications of these findings.

Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability

“…Second, some states in the organization likely have their own insurgency problems and thus want to come down hard on rebel groups in order to deter possible challenges at home-making the organization less attractive to the rebels (a dynamic exacerbated by the presence of transnational groups [Bapat 2007]). Third, one can identify with more certainty the incentives state mediators face for keeping their promises (e.g., to be unbiased, Terris and Maoz 2005) than those faced by regional organizations, where opaque internal dynamics might lead to fundamental, but hard to observe, policy changes. Fourth, rebels might be playing off various supporters against one another (as UNITA did with South Africa, the United States, and other African states [Salehyan 2010]), creating a disincentive for the rebel group to encourage these states to exchange information and work together with the regional organization.…”

Anticipating mediated talks

“…The majority of studies focus on the determinants of mediation in militarized interstate disputes (cf. Melin, 2011;Terris & Maoz, 2005;Böhmelt, 2009;Beardsley, 2010). A few studies have examined third-party offers to mediate or the willingness of conflict parties to accept mediation in civil wars.…”

“…The theoretical framework builds on an expected utility theory of mediation (Melin, 2011;Terris & Maoz, 2005). I argue that mediation will only be chosen if for both conflict parties the expected utility of mediation exceeds the expected utility of conflict.…”

The Mediator's Role in Philippine Schools Overseas (PSO's)

“…Impartiality is neither an indispensable condition of acceptability, nor a necessary condition for successful performance of an intermediary's functions Touval, [36]. Contrary to what other scholars claim, they questioned the value of mediator impartiality Touval, [37], [25]. However, [25], for their part, argue that mediators are seldom indifferent to the terms being negotiated with.…”