Rational Polarization

Dorst, Kevin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918498

Cited by 17 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 115 publications

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“…Nonetheless, not all questions about reflection and identity are answered in this paper. For instance, are identity‐driven and belief‐driven reflection epistemically suspect “motivated reasoning” (Kahan 2016) or merely epistemically rational Bayesian reasoning (Tappin, Pennycook, and Rand 2021; Dorst manuscript)? How might polarizing identity‐driven reflection improve inquiry (Gampa et al 2019; Kitcher 1990)?…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bounded reflectivism and epistemic identity

Byrd

2021

Metaphilosophy

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Reflectivists consider reflective reasoning crucial for good judgment and action. Anti-reflectivists deny that reflection delivers what reflectivists seek. Alas, the evidence is mixed. So, does reflection confer normative value or not? This paper argues for a middle way: reflection can confer normative value, but its ability to do this is bound by such factors as what we might call epistemic identity: an identity that involves particular beliefs-for example, religious and political identities. We may reflectively defend our identities' beliefs rather than reflect open-mindedly to adopt whatever beliefs cohere with the best arguments and evidence. This bounded reflectivism is explicated with an algorithmic model of reflection synthesized from philosophy and science that yields testable predictions, psychometric implications, and realistic metaphilosophical suggestions-for example, overcoming motivated reflection may require embracing epistemic identity rather than veiling it (à la Rawls 1971). So bounded reflectivism should be preferred to views offering anything less.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bounded reflectivism and epistemic identity

Byrd

2021

Metaphilosophy

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“…As Kahneman (2003 aptly summarized in his Nobel Prize Address, this research program "attempted to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent models." Today, an influential view is that cognitive limitations on information processing produce pervasive, pernicious, and perdurable errors and biases in human judgment and decision making (for important critiques, see Cohen, 1981;Dorst, 2022;Gigerenzer, 1996;Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996;Lopes, 1991;Oaksford & Chater, 1994;Stanovich & West, 2000).…”

Section: Steven Pinker Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputational Rationality Theory

Dorison¹

2023

Preprint

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Traditionally, research on human judgment and decision making draws on cognitive psychology to identify deviations from normative standards of how decisions ought to be made. These deviations are commonly considered irrational errors and biases. However, this approach has serious limitations. Critically, even though most decisions are embedded within complex social networks of observers, this approach typically ignores how decisions are perceived by valued audiences. To address this limitation, this article proposes reputational rationality theory: a theoretical model of how observers evaluate targets who do (vs. do not) strictly adhere to normative standards of judgment and choice. Drawing on the dual pathways of homophily and social signaling, the theory generates testable predictions regarding when and why observers positively evaluate error-prone decision makers, termed the benefit of bias hypothesis. Given that individuals hold deep impression management goals, reputational rationality theory challenges the unqualified classification of response tendencies that deviate from normative standards as irrational. That is, apparent errors and biases can, under certain conditions, be reputationally rational. The reputational rewards associated with cognitive biases may in turn contribute to their persistence. Acknowledging the (sometimes beneficial) reputational consequences of cognitive biases can address long-standing puzzles in judgment and decision making as well as generate fruitful avenues for future research.

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“…Psychologists have pioneered this context‐sensitive notion of rationality (Elqayam, 2011, 2012; Gigerenzer, 2010; Lieder & Griffiths, 2019). It largely remains to be seen what an anti‐universalist, variation‐sensitive approach to rationality would look like in philosophy (Douven, 2022; Dorst, ms).…”

Section: Philosophical Implications Of Cognitive Variationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive Variation: The Philosophical Landscape

Ward

2022

Philosophy Compass

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We do not all make choices, reason, interpret our experience, or respond to our environment in the same way. A recent surge of scientific interest has thrust these individual differences into the spotlight: researchers in cognitive psychology and neuroscience are now devoting increasing attention to cognitive variation. The philosophical dimensions of this research, however, have yet to be systematically explored. Here I make an initial foray by considering how cognitive variation is characterized. I present a central dilemma facing descriptions of individual differences, discuss several distinctions used to categorize variation, and show that these distinctions require further elaboration. Finally, by canvassing several philosophical topics for which the characterization of cognitive variation may have significant implications, I argue that philosophers should take note of how and why our minds differ.

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Rational Polarization

Cited by 17 publications

References 115 publications

Bounded reflectivism and epistemic identity

Bounded reflectivism and epistemic identity

Reputational Rationality Theory

Cognitive Variation: The Philosophical Landscape

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