Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color

Brössel, Peter

doi:10.1007/s13164-017-0359-y

Cited by 16 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…But suffice it to say that in the hierarchical scheme that PP postulates, estimates at higher levels of the generative model minimize the prediction error with respect to lower-level hypotheses situated closer to the sensory periphery. Thus, the justification transfer from lower (perceptual) to higher (cognitive) levels is approximately Bayesian (seeBrössel, 2017 for an account of how justification transfer from perception to belief could work in a broadly Bayesian cognitive system).…”

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Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: a foundherentist account

Gładziejewski

2021

Synthese

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In this paper, I use the predictive processing (PP) theory of perception to tackle the question of how perceptual states can be rationally involved in cognition by justifying other mental states. I put forward two claims regarding the epistemological implications of PP. First, perceptual states can confer justification on other mental states because the perceptual states are themselves rationally acquired. Second, despite being inferentially justified rather than epistemically basic, perceptual states can still be epistemically responsive to the mind-independent world. My main goal is to elucidate the epistemology of perception already implicit in PP. But I also hope to show how it is possible to peacefully combine central tenets of foundationalist and coherentist accounts of the rational powers of perception while avoiding the well-recognized pitfalls of either.

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Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: a foundherentist account

Gładziejewski

2021

Synthese

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“…On the contrary, it is natural to think that the rationality of the perceptual process confers a positive epistemic status on perceptual representations of objects (see Siegel [2017] for an influential defense of the view that the rational etiology of a perceptual state affects the epistemic standing of this state). This positive status could be transferred to the beliefs about objects, especially if the move from perception to belief is itself Bayesian (see Brössel [2017]).…”

Section: Paweł Gładziejewskimentioning

confidence: 99%

Un-debunking Ordinary Objects with the Help of Predictive Processing

Gładziejewski¹

2023

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…A notion of similarity is helpful to explicate this relationship. For instance, the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis by some perceptual observation can be assessed based on the degree to which the content of the concept 'matches' the content of the perceptual experience, where matching is a similarity-based condition for the correctness of the concept postulated in the inference (see Brössel (2017) and Hahn and Chater (1998) for two perspectives on this proposal). On this basis, the preference of the hypothesis that EDIBLE MUSHROOM is correct over the hypothesis that MUSHROOM is correct can be justified by citing that the evidential statement "there is a brown-looking, round, short, ... mushroom" is more closely predicted by the hypothesis "there is an edible mushroom", as opposed to the hypothesis "there is a mushroom" since, intuitively, the former two statements are more similar in their meaning than the evidential statement and the latter hypothesis.…”

Section: Compatibility With Shepard's and Tversky's Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Refining the Bayesian Approach to Unifying Generalisation

Poth

2022

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Tenenbaum and Griffiths (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24(4):629–640, 2001) have proposed that their Bayesian model of generalisation unifies Shepard’s (Science 237(4820): 1317–1323, 1987) and Tversky’s (Psychological Review 84(4): 327–352, 1977) similarity-based explanations of two distinct patterns of generalisation behaviours by reconciling them under a single coherent task analysis. I argue that this proposal needs refinement: instead of unifying the heterogeneous notion of psychological similarity, the Bayesian approach unifies generalisation by rendering the distinct patterns of behaviours informationally relevant. I suggest that generalisation as a Bayesian inference should be seen as a complement to, instead of a replacement of, similarity-based explanations. Furthermore, I show that the unificatory powers of the Bayesian model of generalisation can contribute to the selection of one of these models of psychological similarity.

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Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color

Cited by 16 publications

References 66 publications

Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: a foundherentist account

Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: a foundherentist account

Un-debunking Ordinary Objects with the Help of Predictive Processing

Refining the Bayesian Approach to Unifying Generalisation

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