Rational transformative decision-making

Abstract

According to L. A. Paul (2014), transformative experiences pose a challenge for decision theory, as their subjective value is not epistemically accessible. However, several authors propose that the subjective values of options are often irrelevant to their ranking; in many cases, all we need for rational transformative decision-making are the known non-subjective values. This stance is in conflict with Paul’s argument that the subjective value can always swamp the non-subjective value. The approach presented in this paper takes Paul’s argument into account and shows how potential swamping can be controlled given that one desires the transformative outcome: If one knows from previous decisions that desired transformative outcomes are associated with positive subjective value and if, in addition, testimony confirms this association for the current decision situation, one can infer that a desired outcome’s expected subjective value has a positive valence. Accordingly, one can rationally choose the desired transformative option if its non-subjective value is no lower than the overall value of any other option.

Transformative Experience

“…However, the idea that the subjective value can be irrelevant for rational transformative decision-making is not uncontested in the literature. For example, in Villiger (2023), I defend Paul's position that the unknown subjective value of an outcome can always swamp its assessable non-subjective value, thereby rejecting "the irrelevance hypothesis. "…”

“…This criticism comes in four types. First, several authors presented (decision-theoretical) models where rational transformative decision-making becomes possible by use of testimony (Dougherty et al, 2015;Pettigrew, 2015Pettigrew, , 2016Pettigrew, , 2019Sharadin, 2015;Villiger, 2023). At this, they argue that while the use of testimony may not lead to an authentic choice in Paul's sense, such testimony still tells agents something about their own utilities.…”

“…So, the use of testimony does not per se contradict authentic choice. Ultimately, my own desire-based account aims to show that by reflecting on past and present desires and consulting testimony, a choice that is both rational and authentic in Paul's sense becomes possible (see Villiger, 2023).…”

“…Many authors have responded to the challenge that epistemically and/or personally transformative experiences (both together are simply called transformative experiences) pose to rational decision‐making according to Paul (e.g., Arvan, 2015; Bykvist & Stefánsson, 2017; J. Campbell, 2015; Cath, 2019; Chang, 2015; Dougherty et al., 2015; Isaacs, 2020; Kauppinen, 2015; Khan, 2021; Kind, 2020; Mathony & Messerli, 2022; McKinnon, 2015; Pettigrew, 2015, 2016, 2019; Reuter & Messerli, 2018; Sharadin, 2015; Villiger, 2021, 2022, 2023). After a detailed outline of Paul's general argument and its underlying assumptions (Section 2), the present article provides an overview of these responses (Section 3), shows how the concept of transformative experience has been fruitful beyond its original decision‐theoretical context (Section 4), and points to open questions (Section 5).…”