Rational verification: game-theoretic verification of multi-agent systems

Abate, Alessandro; Gutiérrez, Julián; Hammond, Lewis; Harrenstein, Paul; Kwiatkowska, Marta; Najib, Muhammad Sharfi; Perelli, Giuseppe; Steeples, Thomas; Wooldridge, Michael

doi:10.1007/s10489-021-02658-y

Cited by 15 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 81 publications

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“…Given this, it is natural to ask what behaviours a system might exhibit under the assumption that agents act rationally-in accordance with game-theoretic solution concepts. This is the key idea that underpins the rational verification paradigm [2][3][4][5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Concurrent Games

Gutierrez,

Kowara,

Kraus

et al. 2023

Preprint

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In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic equilibrium. Preferences are typically defined by assuming that agents act in pursuit of individual goals, specified as temporal logic formulae. To date, rational verification has been studied using non-cooperative solution concepts-Nash equilibrium and refinements thereof. Such non-cooperative solution concepts assume that there is no possibility of agents forming binding agreements to cooperate, and as such they are restricted in their applicability. In this article, we extend rational verification to cooperative solution concepts, as studied in the field of cooperative game theory. We focus on the core, as this is the most fundamental (and most widely studied) cooperative solution concept. We begin by presenting a variant of the core that seems well-suited to the concurrent game setting, and we show that this version of the core can be characterised using ATL * . We then study the computational complexity of key de-★ This paper is an extended and revised version of [1].

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Concurrent Games

Gutierrez,

Kowara,

Kraus

et al. 2023

Preprint

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“…This paper aims to contribute to the line of research interested in the formal verification of the existence of Nash equilibria in a multiagent system [18,11,8,1]. When there is a solution Nash equilibrium, the techniques used can actually return a multiagent plan that satisfies the requisites.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Careful Autonomous Agents in Environments With Multiple Common Resources

Condurache

Dima

Jitaru

et al. 2022

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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Careful rational synthesis was defined in [7] as a quantitative extension of Fisman et al.'s rational synthesis [11], as a model of multi-agent systems in which agents are interacting in a graph arena in a turn-based fashion. There is one common resource, and each action may decrease or increase the resource. Each agent has a temporal qualitative objective and wants to maintain the value of the resource positive. One must find a Nash equilibrium. This problem is decidable.In more practical settings, the verification of the critical properties of multi-agent systems calls for models with many resources. Indeed, agents and robots consume and produce more than one type of resource: electric energy, fuel, raw material, manufactured goods, etc. We thus explore the problem of careful rational synthesis with several resources. We show that the problem is undecidable. We then propose a variant with bounded resources, motivated by the observation that in practical settings, the storage of resources is limited. We show that the problem becomes decidable, and is no harder than controller synthesis with Linear-time Temporal Logic objectives.

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“…The previously mentioned results all deal with the existence or the synthesis of solutions. Rational verification (instead of synthesis) is studied in [24] (see also the survey [1]), where the authors study how to verify a given specification for a multi-agent system with agents that behave rationally according to an NE when all objectives are specified by LTL formulas. They prove that this problem is 2EXPTIME-complete and design an algorithm that reduces this problem to solving a collection of parity games.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pareto-Rational Verification

Bruyère¹,

Raskin²,

Tamines³

2022

Preprint

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We study the rational verification problem which consists in verifying the correctness of a system executing in an environment that is assumed to behave rationally. We consider the model of rationality in which the environment only executes behaviors that are Pareto-optimal with regards to its set of objectives, given the behaviour of the system (which is committed in advance of any interaction). When the objectives are ω-regular, we prove that the Pareto-rational verification problem is co-NP-complete and fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) in the number of objectives of the environment. When the objectives are described by LTL formulas, the problem is PSPACE-complete as the classical LTL modelchecking problem. In order to evaluate the applicability of our results in practice, we have implemented and evaluated two variations of our FPT algorithm on our running example and on randomly generated instances.

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Rational verification: game-theoretic verification of multi-agent systems

Cited by 15 publications

References 81 publications

Cooperative Concurrent Games

Cooperative Concurrent Games

Careful Autonomous Agents in Environments With Multiple Common Resources

Pareto-Rational Verification

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