Rationality of bargaining solutions

Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: Rationalizability and Nash solutions

“…It may be noted that (CON) introduced above is somewhat weaker than a continuity property introduced in Peters and Vermeulen (2010), but very different from various other continuity properties discussed in the literature on bargaining problems (see, for example, Kaneko (1980), Bossert (1994), Wakker (1991), andSánchez (2000)). To a certain degree, (CON) is a fairly weak requirement as it restricts its applicability to a class of problems each consisting of the comprehensive hull of two points.…”

“…This is in sharp contrast with the result obtained for convex problems. For instance, Sánchez (2000)) shows that Nash's IIA and Pareto Continuity (for this definition, see Peter and Wakker (1991) or Sánchez (2000)) are sufficient for single-valued bargaining solutions to be rationalizable in the context of convex problems.…”

Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond

“…The relevance of contraction independence and of the axioms of revealed preference in answering this question is uncovered by Peters and Wakker (1987), Bossert (1994b), and Sánchez (2000). A related question is addressed by .…”

AutoMed: an automated mediator for multi-issue bilateral negotiations

“…Prominent bargaining solution concepts (such as the Nash solution [27] and the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution) have been considered by researchers in Game Theory as "fair" solutions to the Nash Bargaining Problem and are usually designed for a mediator in an environment with complete information [26,34,45]. A bargaining solution, or in our case-a suggestion made by the mediator in order to solve the negotiated conflict-should satisfy a number of properties [30,39].…”