Rationality: What difference does it make?

Abstract

A variety of interpreters have argued that Kant construes the animality of human beings as 'transformed', in some sense, through the possession of rationality. I argue that this interpretation admits of multiple readings and that it is either wrong, or doesn't result in the conclusion for which its proponents argue. I also explain the sense in which rationality nevertheless significantly differentiates human beings from other animals. the human being, as an animal endowed with the capacity of reason (animal rationabile), can make out of himself a rational animal (animal rational) Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:321 (1798) IMMANUEL KANT 1 How should we conceive of the possession of rationality? At the least, in asking this question we need to distinguish between the property of being rational (or of acting rationally), which one seemingly can have or not at different points in one's life, and the capacity to have such a property or act in such a manner, which may more plausibly be said to be integral to the normal maturation of a human being. So understood we can now make sense of the point Immanuel Kant makes in 1 Quotations from Kant's work are from the Akademie Ausgabe, with the first Critique cited by the standard A/B edition pagination, and the other works by volume and page. Where available, translations generally follow The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, general editors Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. References to other primary texts follow available English translations where possible. For a complete list of abbreviations see the end of the article.