Rationalizable Screening and Disclosure Under Unawareness

Francetich, Alejandro; Schipper, Burkhard C.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3868575

Cited by 5 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Given Γ and its associated normal-form game G, define player i's set of normal-form information sets 8 by…”

Section: Associated Normal-form Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2021) proved that the set of prudent rationalizable strategies is non-empty and discussed various properties and examples. It has been useful in solving disclosure games with and without unawareness (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2021, Li and Schipper, 2019, 2020, electoral campaigning under unawareness (Schipper and Woo, 2019), and screening and disclosure under unawareness (Francetich and Schipper, 2022). Here we study how to capture this solution concept by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.…”

Section: Prudent Rationalizability and Iterated Conditional Weak Domi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The problem with familiar equilibrium concepts is that a player's awareness may change endogenously during the course of play making the equilibrium assumption of an ex ante ready-made behavioral convention often implausible; see Schipper (2021) for an extensive discussion. As a remedy, rationalizability concepts have been proposed Schipper, 2013, 2021) and successfully used in applications Woo, 2019, Francetich andSchipper, 2022). It is well-known that rationalizability in the normal form is equivalent to the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (Pearce, 1984).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It may be rationalizable for a player to make an opponent aware of one of the opponent's actions that is extremely bad for the player because the player is allowed to believe that the opponent will not take this action. As a remedy, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2021) introduced a version of extensive-form rationalizability using the idea of prudence or caution that proved to be instrumental in applications such as disclosure of verifiable information (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2013, Li and Schipper, 2019, 2020, electoral campaigning (Schipper and Woo, 2019), and screening under unawareness (Francetich and Schipper, 2022). This solution concept, called prudent rationalizability, could be viewed as an extensive-form analogue of iterated admissibility in dynamic games with unawareness.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conditional Dominance in Games With Unawareness

Meier

Schipper

2022

SSRN Journal

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“…Given Γ and its associated normal-form game G, define player i's set of normal-form information sets 8 by…”

Section: Associated Normal-form Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Prudent Rationalizability and Iterated Conditional Weak Domi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Conditional Dominance in Games With Unawareness

Meier

Schipper

2022

SSRN Journal

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“…von Thadden and Zhao (2012) andAuster (2013) study principal-agent problems with moral hazard Auster and Pavoni (2019). andLei and Zhao (2019) consider optimal delegation under unawareness Francetich and Schipper (2020). analyze screening under unawareness.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Value Capture in the Face of Known and Unknown Unknowns

Schipper¹,

Bryan²,

Ryall³

2022

Strategy Science

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A large theoretical literature on value capture uses cooperative games under complete information to study how and why firms earn supernormal profits. However, firms often have different information, beliefs, or creative foresight. We extend value capture theory to incomplete information (“known unknowns”) or unawareness (“unknown unknowns”) and illustrate some conceptual issues with that extension. Using the case study of Cirque du Soleil, we show how an entrepreneurial firm can profit even when it does not contribute materially to value creation. In a case study of Apple iTunes, we show how value capture depends quantitatively on the beliefs of other firms.

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Level-k thinking in the extensive form

Schipper,

Zhou

2024

Econ Theory

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Level-k thinking has been widely applied as a solution concept for games in normal form in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider level-k thinking in games in extensive form. Player’s may learn about levels of opponents’ thinking during the play of the game because some information sets may be inconsistent with certain levels. In particular, for any information set reached, a level-k player attaches the maximum level-$$\ell $$ ℓ thinking for $$\ell < k$$ ℓ < k to her opponents consistent with the information set. We compare our notion of strong level-k thinking with other solution concepts such as level-k thinking in the associated normal form, strong rationalizability, $$\Delta $$ Δ -rationalizability, iterated admissibility, backward rationalizability, backward level-k thinking, and backward induction. We use strong level-k thinking to reanalyze data from some prior experiments in the literature.

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Rationalizable Screening and Disclosure Under Unawareness

Cited by 5 publications

References 48 publications

Conditional Dominance in Games With Unawareness

Conditional Dominance in Games With Unawareness

Value Capture in the Face of Known and Unknown Unknowns

Level-k thinking in the extensive form

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